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ABSTRACT 
 
My aim is to analyze the proposal conceived by John Perry in his book Reference 
and Reflexivity so I can see how this proposal accounts for the informative value of 
sentences containing co-referential terms and empty terms. Informativeness problem 
is about how to explain the informative value of sentences containing those terms 
when semantics, at first glance, seems unable to do it. My aim is to use the toolbox 
that Perry's proposal provides to show how we can answer, via semantics, the 
problems I present in each chapter so that I can make a case for semantics. 
 
Key-words: language; semantics; epistemology. 
 
  
  
RESUMO 
 
Meu objetivo é analisar a proposta trabalhada por John Perry em Reference and 
Reflexivity para lidar com o valor informacional de sentenças contendo termos co-
referenciais e termos vazios. O problema da informatividade é sobre explicar como 
sentenças contendo tais termos transmitem informação quando, à primeira vista, 
essa explicação é inviável se apelamos a seus conteúdos semânticos. Meu objetivo 
é usar o ferramental proposto por Perry para dar resposta aos problemas que 
apresento em cada capítulo e mostrar que é possível resolvê-los via semântica. 
 
Palavras-chave: linguagem; semântica; epistemologia.  
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Introduction 
 
It is not hard to see that speakers exchange information in several 
circumstances of their lives. It is a matter of fact also that this information is extremely 
helpful for them to drive their actions and, thus, build their thoughts and believes, 
whatever might be their daily routines. But it is not obvious that semantics is the 
responsible for doing this job of accounting for the informative value encoded in 
linguistic expressions. Speakers mean things by using language, they aim to 
communicate to each other to achieve some goal.  
The informative value is the information that the speakers convey by 
means of words. Babylonians believed that the planet Venus was in fact two different 
celestial corpuses, which made them deploy two different names to convey different 
information, namely, Hesperus and Phosphorus. If you are addicted in Ancient stories 
and anecdotes, or are used to stop by in channels like National Geographic, you 
certainly know that Babylonians knew from far away that it was a single object.1 But 
for the sake of the argument, suppose that they indeed believed that there were two 
corpuses and use Hesperus to refer to Venus during the morning, whereas 
Phosphorus to refer to the same planet during the evening. If this is the case, they 
did it not because they simply wanted to name one thing with different names, but 
because they truly believed that they were in front of two different corpuses. But 
where does informative value come from when we are dealing with names that refer 
to the same thing? More precisely, what different thing would a speaker be saying 
using Hesperus instead Phosphorus if both of them stand for the very same object? If 
you feel stuck by these questions, you probably got the troubling idea behind them. 
This is the problem involving informativeness. 
Giants of philosophy of language since the seminal paper Sense and 
Reference2 have argued for and against the role of semantics over informative value 
of expressions. The developments in semantics over the years though provided us 
                                            
1
 Waerden, Bartel (1974). Science awakening II: the birth of astronomy, p. 56. 
2
 Frege, (1892/1948). Sense and Reference. 
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with interesting results and give us tools to argue in favour of the role of semantics in 
accounting for informative value. 
Put the Babylonian example aside for a while and think about the following 
situation. Two friends are talking to each other when one of them sees a guy with a 
peculiar haircut crossing the street and one of them, let’s call him Wally, says “that 
dude needs a haircut” and the other friend, let’s call him Zach, looks at the guy’s 
direction but ended up seeing another guy, with a strange haircut also. In the case of 
this speaker, Zach, referring to an individual who he thinks that is the same one his 
friend Wally referred to, is there any semantic device which guarantees that the 
referent has been preserved in this conversation, even given the fact that Zach made 
a mistake when he uses the referring tools to refer to the right guy. In other words, 
are we able to preserve information even in cases in which one of the speakers 
confusingly deploys referring expressions? Specifically regarding the conversation 
above, what kind of information is preserved and shared with each other?  
Now think about this other situation. You are dad and your daughter tells 
you that she loved the gift she earned from Santa Claus. In this case, the similar 
question comes around again: what is preserved in the conversation so that your 
daughter is able to form her belief despite no Santa Claus really exists and, thus, no 
origin of information could be attained? 
In my work, I will analyze Perry’s proposal of reflexive contents and show 
how it can account for issues concerning informativeness. My aim is to argue, with 
the help of technical literature, that the toolbox provided by Perry’s proposal can help 
us to account for difficulties involving the informative value of expressions using what 
Perry calls reflexive content. I divided my analysis in three chapters, which I brief in 
the following lines below. 
In the first chapter, I present the background on which the discussion of 
the following chapters will be based. I explain what is reflexive content and its 
difference from referential content, and also the concepts of cognitive route and what 
Perry calls notion. Then, in the second chapter, I present a special kind of co-
reference, which the technical literature calls co-reference de jure. My aim is to 
assess two opposite views about the characterization of co-reference de jure to 
present my objections with the help of the toolbox provided by Perry. First, I explore 
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Fine’s proposal of co-reference de jure to show how it faces problems with the help of 
Recanati’s critiques. According to him, the way Fine characterizes co-reference de 
jure is not a good way to characterize co-reference de jure because it doesn’t hold in 
cases involving empty names and confusion of reference. Recanati’s strategy is to 
weaken the relation upon which co-reference de jure relies so that it holds even in 
those problematic scenarios he brought.  
Next I focus the analysis on Fine’s notion of coordinated proposition and 
how it helps us to understand what is behind co-reference de jure. I brought 
Recanati’s proposal of mental files to show his critique on Fine’s notion of 
coordination as based on semantic features. According to Recanati, we should 
actually base coordination upon cognitive constraints. I disagree with both readings 
that Recanati provides and the last section of this chapter is dedicated to show why 
these readings are wrong. 
Finally, in the third chapter, I turn my analysis on Perry’s proposal of 
reflexive content to tackle the problem of empty terms. My aim is to continue to use 
the toolbox that he provides to assess cases involving this kind of term. In this step, 
my aim is to show how Perry’s proposal could answer the question of what is 
expressed by utterances containing empty terms and, thus, what information is 
conveyed, if anything, in those cases in a way that the answer, which appeals to a 
kind of identifying condition, can resist over Kripke’s modal argument attacks and, at 
the same time, maintain the status of what is said by the very utterances at stake. To 
do so, I analyzed other two proposals, Salmon’s and Russell’s response, to show 
their fails and, thus, their inability to handle the problem.   
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1.The background 
1.1 Type/token and utterance-sentence distinction 
 
One thing that we have to establish is what type of semantics we are 
dealing with and what expressions are at stake in order to analyze the problems we 
aim to. I want to present some concepts and establish the some basic terminology 
which will be useful for us to start the discussion. 
Types, tokens and utterances are three distinct concepts we will work with. 
Type-token distinction is an easily conceivable distinction people can find many 
times: type is any replicable pattern and token is the replicated pattern physically 
instantiated. Sentences and utterances mirror this relation. So if a sentence is any 
combination of words (organized according to a given syntax) which express 
something meaningful, utterances are physical instances of sentences by which 
speakers seek to mean something. If I say “my pants are black” and other person 
says “my pants are black”, both of us produced two utterances of the same kind, of 
the same type. I said what I said by using a token and he said what he said by using 
other token.  
In many circumstances we produce tokens to make utterances in a way 
that both cannot be duplicated. But whereas utterances and tokens cannot be 
repeated in any circumstance, the same token can be used to produce different 
utterances, which means that there is a subtle distinction between tokens and 
utterances. Suppose I go to the library and I find a piece of paper saying “I’m using 
this seat” over a book that lies upon one of the desks in the library. The guy who is 
using that seat comes back and leaves that note upon his desk. I approach and ask 
him if I can borrow that note because I have to leave my seat for a while to have 
lunch. I leave the note upon my desk and then and go out to have lunch. What I did is 
to use the same token to produce an utterance which differs from that one that guy 
produced because they ultimately express different contents. 
Tokens can be seen as tools to represent utterances, but not always they 
do that job. Suppose you hear a parrot is shouting out loud sounds that look like “The 
sky is blue”. The act of reproducing this stream of sounds doesn’t amount to a 
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production of an utterance, because those sounds are not reproduced as an act of an 
agent aiming to mean something. Once the parrot is not able to use them aiming to 
express something meaningful, the token he reproduced are not utterances. There 
should have an intentional act of standing for something in order for that token to be 
considered an utterance.  
Many physical marks that we find daily we infer that they are tokens of 
utterances though. If I find a piece of paper saying “you’re funny” at the library, I infer 
that someone produced an utterance using that token, that is, I infer that that piece of 
paper with those marks represent an utterance produced by someone who had the 
intention to do so. Likewise any inference we make daily, there are facts in the world 
which allow us to link them to that token and draw conclusions. So the fact that that 
token was upon the desk in a library, and that there was someone who took a seat in 
that desk allows me to conclude that there was someone there who wrote that note 
and left it there upon that desk with a certain purpose of communication. Same thing 
with the sounds and other signals we hear and see all our daily life long, we suppose 
that a great amount of them are derived from utterances. 
Tokens can also be used to produce utterances with different meanings. I 
can take a signal saying “You must stop now” to warn people of an accident on the 
road, but also to make kids stop speaking during a guessing game. This token can be 
used twice to represent different utterances with subtle, but important different 
meanings. Using an example Perry gave can fill my lack of creativity: 
 
Suppose there is a sign in a flying-school, intended to warn would-be pilots: 
‘Flying planes can be dangerous.’ The flying school goes bankrupt; the 
manager of a park near the airport buys the sign and puts it next to another 
sign that prohibits walking on high tightropes. In its new use, the sign is a 
token of a type with a different syntax and a different meaning than in its 
original use.
3
 
 
So the same token can represent different utterances. These utterances 
can represent sentences of the same meaning, but also of different meaning, which 
means that these utterances with different meanings are instantiations/replications of 
                                            
3
 Perry (2012), p. 46 
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different type-sentences. In the case above, we can see that those utterances 
express different propositions because they belong to different types of sentences. 
Those contents, which we call propositions, are contents which utterances 
express, whereas meaning is something that belongs to sentences. A sentence is 
associated with a proposition only when it is instantiated as an utterance, given a 
certain place and a certain time. Nothing happens if a sentence doesn’t make itself 
concrete by being instantiated, no proposition is expressed unless its utterance 
occurs given a context of use. Even though the all explanation above was done to 
distinguish sentences and utterances, I will use them interchangeably in the following 
chapter in some circumstances for the sake of simplicity. The clarification I’ve done 
aims to show the subtle differences between one and another and make clear that 
this difference exists. Putting this difference in perspective, context is the factor which 
makes it possible and, thus, the stage from which semantic features like propositions 
and truth-values can arise. That’s what we will focus on next session. 
1.2 The use of context 
 
Perry distinguishes three uses of context: pre-semantic, semantic and 
content-supplementing. Here I assume a pre-theoretic definition of context, which is 
the situation, individualized by a given time and location, in which an utterance 
occurs and in virtue of which a proposition can be determined. By holding this 
feature, utterances are said context-dependent, that is, they depend upon time and 
location in order to express a propositional content. However, there are some of uses 
of context just for getting rid of any confusion about the use of the expression, 
whereas others have the context-dependence as part of what defines their meaning. 
Demonstratives and indexicals, expressions like ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘now’, ‘that man’ 
and so on are expressions which share this context-dependence feature: given a 
context, those expressions will take a element of the context as their referent, 
according to the linguistic convention/rule that governs their uses. And these rules 
are given in terms of these elements of context. If we look at the meaning of the 
indexical I, we will notice that its meaning involves the mention of the very agent who 
is tokening the indexical at stake. We will see later that this characteristic allows 
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Perry to establish reflexive content: the kind of content whose constituents are about 
the expressions tokened themselves. In the case of the token of the indexical I 
above, the context dictates what is its referent. Names are not like that though. If I 
was named Gustavo, the baptizing act provides the place and time in which the 
convention used to fix its referent was established, but once it’s been established 
Gustavo will refer to me regardless the context in which it occurs. So contexts are 
used with different purposes. We will analyze each one in order to clarify those 
different uses that context presents. 
The first use concerns with pre-semantic use of the context. This one is 
responsible for identifying which convention is being used with respect to an 
utterance. Suppose that I meet a note saying Gustavo, your solution is right! upon my 
desk at the library. Something tells me that that name refers to me, since some hours 
ago I helped a friend of mine to solve a tricky arithmetic puzzle from his weekly math 
assignment. The context helps me to figure out what convention is being applied 
concerning the use of that token of Gustavo. If I’m not wrong, the convention applied 
is that one which links me to that token and the context was responsible for providing 
me with facts which allows me infer this conclusion. 
The speaker looks for justifying the beliefs he has towards the utterance 
so that he can ground the actions he plan to take. For this reason any fact that 
surrounds the existence of the token is important for the speaker to achieve his aim 
of figuring out which convention is being used that justifies the existence of that token 
under that circumstance. So the particular color of the ink and the way the words 
were written may provide me with information to infer that was indeed my friend I 
helped out some hours ago who wrote that note to thank me for the favour. Other 
way to obtain information is asking him directly and find if that token is really used to 
refer to me. However, not always we are not so privileged to acquire sufficient 
information to guess what meaning is being used. The point is that facts and events 
of the world drive my representations since they encode information to dictate how 
my beliefs and thoughts about the object represented will be. The information that 
facts and events encode can provide me with grounds to think about how the world 
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should be so that those facts and events hold.4 In other words, they indicate or show 
us how something should have happened in order for them to be obtained. So telling 
us how the world should operate provides us with valuable information to uncover 
what those facts and events actually signify.   
As I’ve mentioned, the color I’m familiar with is usually used by my friend 
and the fact that I recognize the marks as being pretty similar to his allows me to infer 
that the person who wrote that note containing the token Gustavo is written by my 
friend. Those facts that surround the note in question helped me to eliminate some 
possible scenarios and allowed me to shrink the range of possibilities about which I 
had to think. So it helped me to discard the possibility of such note appearing 
suddenly from nothing upon my desk, which means that given the existence of that 
note under that circumstance, the belief I produced is driven by the assumptions on 
how the world operates so that those things I believe could hold in that way.5 
So, in many circumstances, context is like a footprint which allows 
speakers to find out what meaning is being applied in the situation in which the 
utterance occurs. Among thousands of uses of the name Gustavo, that one is applied 
to refer to me. Context, in this case, aims to disentangle something which seems 
ambiguity, but in fact, it is homonymy. All the tokens of Gustavo which refer to me are 
of the same type, for all of them are governed by the same convention. Nevertheless, 
tokens of Gustavo which refer to the Brazilian swimmer Gustavo Borges are all 
tokens of other type, that is, the type which establishes and governs the uses of the 
tokens which refer to Gustavo Borges. Our names are homonymy: they refer to 
different individuals and present different meanings, although they are 
typographically indistinguishable. The context, in this case, help speakers to figure 
out which type is being used. 
                                            
4
 Perry (2012), p. 23 
5
 As Perry exemplifies, the fact that there’s a newspaper in front of my door imposes restrictions over 
me on how world should be to such a thing can happen. Such a fact gives him information that 
dictates and conducts my belief, as if the constraints the world presents (social and physical ones) 
restrict the assumptions I make about how the world is and what beliefs I’m (legitimately) in position to 
hold. So the fact Perry sees that newspaper in front of his door tells him that someone left it there, that 
this person left it there intending to do so, that it was not dropped by an airplane and so on, which 
means that it provides him with information that allows him to infer that a person such as the 
newspaper guy was at door to leave it to him. 
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This use of context is like solving misunderstandings we might have during 
trivial situations. Suppose you take back your car after almost one month in the 
mechanic and suddenly see other car parked on your vacancy in your condominium 
and you decide to complain about it with the person who you suppose that is the 
car’s owner. So when you asked him why he parked his car there he simply 
answered your question saying “well, because that vacancy is mine now”. That 
doesn’t sound much promising and now you got stuck by the fact that you were sure 
that vacancy is yours but your neighbor is saying that it’s his. Something that you 
didn’t realize is that the condominium manager relocated your vacancy in order to fix 
problems concerning the growth of people who have just moved there. And as you 
were not using your car for a while you didn’t pay attention to that change and, in 
addition to that, you didn’t read the email notifying you that your vacancy was 
changed. So after talking to the condominium manager you figured out what 
happened and realized that the use of your car vacancy was changed because the 
rule that legislates its use has changed. So the conflict has been arisen from the fact 
that you didn’t know which rule was governing the use of that car vacancy. 
Same thing with pre-semantic use of context. Its use aims to disentangle 
misunderstandings generated by homonymy. In the case of the word tip, we don’t 
know what it means if we are not informed (explicitly or by the context) which 
meaning is being used. If I’m in a restaurant and in the bill is written “tips are 15%”, 
the fact I’m having lunch in a restaurant allows me to infer that the word tip, in this 
case, means the money waiters and waitresses earn for doing their job. But if I’m in a 
company doing a job interview and the interviewer says to me “a good tip for a 
newbie programmer is to practice as much as it is possible”, facts that surround that 
token of tip informs me that, in that context, tip means the same thing as advice. So 
I’m unable to figure out what that token of tip means unless I grasp those contextual 
facts surrounding the existence of that token. Likewise, I’m unable to figure out which 
name is being used unless I grasp facts related to the token Gustavo which inform 
me what meaning is governing its use. So it’s the context which will inform me what is 
the meaning that is governing the utterance I meet. Its use is pre-semantics because 
the meaning is only given when the facts which are part of the context are taken into 
account. 
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The second use cares about expressions whose meaning has already 
been established. This is the case of indexicals and demonstratives. The role that 
context plays is to help those expressions to accomplish their task of determining its 
referent. In this case, the meaning of the indexical tokened uses the context to exploit 
it and the object to which the indexical refers is an element of the context. Its 
meaning is directly connected with what kind of role the object plays in comparison 
with the agent of the utterance, that is, the role that an object plays in the context is 
linked to the meaning the indexical tokened has. Each element/component of the 
context plays a specific role on the agent’s cognition and the mechanics of the 
indexical is the correlation between those two distinct but closely connected roles:  
 
[...] linguistic roles are closely associated with other roles that objects play in 
our lives. The speaker of the utterance I hear is often the person I am 
looking at; the place an utterance is made is usually the place the speaker 
occupies, and usually near the place the listener occupies. So, when I learn 
that an object plays a linguistic role relative to an utterance I hear, I learn 
about other roles that it plays.
6
 
 
The use of context in this case is semantic because given the meaning of 
the indexical tokened, the indexical will always refer to a certain element of the 
context. So the use is not for disentangling issues relative to meaning, but enabling 
the meaning of the indexical exploits the elements of the context in order to 
determine its content. No doubt when hundreds of speakers utter I when using it in 
an utterance, each one of us end up expressing totally different propositions. But 
each token of I determine its referent by exploiting the same linguistic role. When you 
and me say now, the meaning of this indexical drive our tokens to determine the 
object that plays the same role, in this case, the time or instant in which my utterance 
and yours occur. The meaning of I and now, thus, govern their tokens in a way that 
each one refers to objects which are part of the context and whose existence plays a 
certain role upon our cognitive life. It means that this use of context is useful for 
discovering what kind of role a certain object play upon us when a certain indexical is 
tokened. 
                                            
6
 Perry [1997], p. 3 
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Suppose I’m walking on the street in Rio and I see someone opening the 
door and saying “Yes, I live here!” to the postman. Let’s call this utterance u. So the 
meaning of the indexical I drives that token to a specific element of the context of u, 
which plays a specific role on my cognition, in this case, it informs me that its referent 
is the speaker of u. So by hearing u I figure out that the speaker of u lives in the place 
in which u is uttered, which allows me to infer that the speaker of u is the same 
person who is in front of me and the place in which u occurs is the place where I’m 
looking at. Suppose that guy is actually Zeca Pagodinho, who I couldn’t see early 
because my vision was blocked by a truck parked near his house. In addition to that, 
suppose I figure out the street I stopped by is called Rua do Catete and his address 
number is 155. So in the end of this process, with the help of the information provided 
by the indexicals in u, I can achieve the belief that Zeca Pagodinho lives in Rua do 
Catete 155 .7 
The third use is the content-supplementing use. In this use, the context 
provides the content which will complete the propositional content that is missing. It’s 
supplementing because the meaning and the content of each word (including 
indexicals) tokened in the utterance have already determined, but the utterance 
cannot determine a proposition unless that the speaker infers the missing component 
from the context. Suppose that you turn on your TV and tune it to a news channel in 
which the reporter is adding comments on the weather forecast report by saying 
 
(3) The weather is cloudy and cold now. 
 
All those expressions in (3) are meaningful and present their referents. But 
nothing in the expressions contained in (3) tell us the place at which (3) was uttered. 
If we take for granted that any proposition expressed by an utterance should have 
place and time as its constituents, so without the determination of place and time (3) 
cannot be associated with a proposition. Take for granted also that time is given by 
                                            
7
 In the case of anaphoric use of indexicals, the role that defines the use of such expression is played 
by other expressions in the same utterance. That expression establishes a relation of antecedence 
with the deictic in question, and not things that are not words. So in “Bob Dylan is a great songwriter, 
he wrote lots of beautiful songs”, the meaning of he is provided by its relation with the name Bob 
Dylan, which is placed early the occurrence of he. Cf. Perry (2012), pp. 46-7 
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the indexal now. So the only thing has been missed is the place at which the weather 
is such and such. The answer to this is that this missing element is something 
provided by the context: the audience infer that the news reporter aimed to inform 
them about the weather situation from his perspective, that is, his goal is to say 
something about the place at which he is bringing the news when he utters (3). 
Notice that what the audience infer is crucial. As we’ve seen, speakers 
infer from facts and events how the world should be so that those facts and events 
can hold in that world. If I’m on my phone, for example, and I asked my dad why he 
didn’t come home for dinner yet and my dad says “I got completely stuck by the traffic 
jam”, I can infer from the context that my dad aimed to say that the place at which he 
was at the moment of that utterance is place where the traffic was stuck. So taking as 
a fact/event that my dad wouldn’t utter such a thing unless he had a reason to do so, 
I infer from it how the world should be to that utterance be meaningful in that 
situation. In the case of (3), the best strategy to interpret and explain the fact that (3) 
has been uttered is assuming that the news reporter aimed to say something about 
weather condition of the place where he was at that moment he uttered (3). The 
context, in this case, enables speakers to make inferences from facts that surround 
the utterance produced so they can grasp the element that is not articulated in any 
part of the utterance, but whose existence is relevant for the determination of the 
proposition.8 
Suppose, for example, I’m in a party and I call my friend in a local in which 
he cannot hear the bands and the sound outdoors. It’s an untypical day and in my 
friend’s mind it’s not expected that I’m in such a place. Before letting him say 
something I say it in advance: “Hey man! The party is awesome!”. There’s nothing 
available for him from which he can infer that in the place in which I’m located is 
happening a party. So it’s reasonable to think that my friend would ask something like 
“what party?” or “where? What are you talking about”. However, if he could hear 
bands playing and people talking aloud, those facts would enable him to infer that the 
place in which I was located was happening a party and, thus, he could complete 
what is said by my utterance with the missing element. The sound he listen to is the 
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relevant information that context provides him to explain what my utterance is about 
is the party that is happening in the place I’m located. In short, this use of context is 
to deal with cases of unarticulated constituents. 
So Perry distinguishes two main situations in which unarticulated 
constituent can arise:  
 
1. The first one is is those cases in which there’s nothing wrong with the 
syntax and the meaning of the utterance and its parts, but the utterance 
cannot determine a proposition unless the unarticulated constituent comes out 
with the help of the context. This case can be exemplified by the party 
example and also by circumstances in which one speaker wants to check with 
respect to what the utterance can be said true or false, such as when he asks 
“with respect to what Starbucks’s services are good?” when he hear another 
speaker saying “Starbuck has good services”. It sounds like a pedantic use of 
content-supplementing, as Perry explains, because the speaker intuitively 
knows that the predicate is good is not an absolute predicate, but a relational 
one, which means that something is good always in relation or in comparison 
with something else fixed as the standpoint, and in trivial communication 
routine speakers are not used to ask those questions. In both of them the 
utterance itself is not syntactically incorrect neither incomplete, but the 
speaker needs to appeal to the context so that its content can be completed.9 
 
2. The second one concerns with cases in which there’s nothing articulated in 
the logical form of the utterance that provides the existence of the missing 
element and the utterance is not syntactically complete. However, the 
unarticulated content and the syntactic element can be inferred from the 
context. This cases involves utterances the speaker says something 
syntactically incomplete and then with (at least) one unarticulated constituent, 
but the audience grasp what the speaker means by elements present in the 
context itself. So if the teacher wants to check if a certain student did the 
                                            
9
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homework, he asks “Nicolas, did you do your homework ?”. If Nicolas says 
something like “I didn’t”, the utterance is syntactically incomplete, but the 
missing syntactic components are easily grasped by the teacher by the fact 
that those elements can easily be inferred by the teacher from the context. So 
the grammatical object of Nicolas’s utterance is implicitly present in his 
utterance because the teacher, in that context, asked him about the homework 
which is scheduled to be done. So the audience do the job of completing the 
missing parts in order to provide the utterance with the proposition.10 
 
I won’t get into details about this topic. My aim is just to clarify the idea of 
context and it works, and mainly, explain the different uses that speakers can make 
of it. 
1.3 Cognitive routes 
 
Let’s begin with an example. As I go to my university, I’m used to see 
places from which I build an idea in my mind, that is, a representation. Maybe years 
later I can go back there and see lots of changes, and then the representation that I 
had in mind can be compared with the perceptions I have at this moment that I see 
those objects again. All those representations Perry says that they contribute to the 
speaker form what he calls notions. My notions can be attached to my perceptual 
representations or detached from it. My notion of the library of the department I built 
from the perception I had when I used to study there and it was attached to that 
perceptions I had at the university. I can gather information about the library and add 
it to my notion of it so I can think about the object at stake more accurately. I can be 
told that the library was relaunched in 2014, that now it has three floors, that its 
colour was changed to white, and so on. Years later I can take that notion and use it 
to recognize it as the same building where I used to do my research. 
Those notions that speakers build apart from the object are said detached 
from it and characterize lots of representations that speakers bear in mind. In the 
absence of objects we create notions that help us to drive ourselves in the world and 
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plan our course of actions in a way that they let us take accomplish our actions. We 
can think about the times I told my mom that I was studying at that library while I was 
talking to her. In those moments, my mom built her notion of the library and stored all 
information about it in that notion so that she can organize her beliefs. Next time she 
could be told again about the library, she would grab all the information she was told 
and compare them with those stored in her notion to see whether it was about that 
library specifically. All information about the library that my mom gathered in her 
notion helps her to drive her actions. My notion of the library is certainly different from 
hers, but both are helpful tools to coordinate our actions and achieve what we aimed 
in our daily lifes. As our notions are composed by different ideas and perceptual 
representations, the more accurate are those ideas and the descriptions associated 
with the perceptual representations, the easier our notions can be communicated to 
our audience. 
Think about Perry’s example which I present, but just modified a little.11 A 
boy aims to take his father’s attention so he can see what the boy is seeing: a 
McDonald restaurant. He and his brothers are in the back of the car while his father 
drives alongside his mother while they are going to his grandpa’s house. Suddenly 
the boy, let’s call him Nicolas, sees a McDonald’s near the gas station at some point 
of the road. Nicolas is hungry and, for this reason, he really wants his father to stop 
the car so that he can order a Big Mac. To do so he has to make a plan and choose 
what expressions are better to employ in order to convey the information he wants to 
achieve his goal. Maybe simply tokening that building in his utterance could be 
promising. Nicolas points out the building he’s looking at and says to his father: 
“Look, dad! I’m hungry and that building is a McDonald’s”. His father turned his head 
on the direction Nicolas pointed out but he ended up seeing just a dirty car repair 
building because the gas station had already gone when he looked at the direction 
his son pointed. He ended up seeing other building instead and all the plan Nicolas 
had fell apart. Nicolas failed to communicate what he planned because he wasn’t 
lucky enough in deploying the linguistic tools available to him and necessary to 
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succeed in his plan. He aimed to drive dad’s attention towards the building where 
McDonald’s is located, but he couldn’t make it by using the expression that building. 
In this example, Nicolas had a notion of the McDonald’s restaurant and 
applied when he saw the building. His notion, which was detached from his 
perception at first moment becomes attached to it. But once he needed to 
communicate the information he gained and encoded by his notion, he could not 
succeed to make his father acquire the information his notion encodes. His father 
certainly has also his own notion of McDonald’s, but the way Nicolas conducted him 
by deploying that building didn’t allow his father to apply his own notion at the 
moment he heard Nicolas's utterance. The transmission of information failed and it 
prevented his father from turning the car’s maneuver towards the direction intended 
by his son. 
Perry exploits the concept of source and applicandum, which I think it’s 
helpful also. As he explains, 
 
An information game involves the acquisition and later application of a belief 
about an individual. That is, at some time one comes to believe something 
about some person or object. Then, later, that belief guides one’s behavior 
towards that object or at least an object that one takes to be the same as it. I 
call the object about which one acquires the belief the source. I call the 
object to which one applies the belief—the object one takes to be the 
source—the applicandum. In any information game, one faces the problem 
of making reasonably sure that the source is the applicandum.
12
 
  
In the case we’ve exploited, Nicolas in some moment of his life created his 
notion of McDonald’s restaurants, which plays the role of the source in this 
terminology, and he applied it to an object he takes to be as the same as the source. 
He wanted to make sure that his father achieves the same belief. His father also 
acquired a notion of McDonald’s at some moment of his life, and was inducted to 
apply it when Nicolas made his utterance containing the token that building. But when 
his father applies his notion, the object he gets perceptually, the applicandum, has 
nothing to do with his notion McDonald’s that he has in mind. 
Indexicals like that and variants are good instruments to refer and succeed 
in this kind of information game. Suppose I’m at my university and I’m looking for the 
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new library that is going to be inaugurated next week in the institute of biology (IB). I 
grab information about it, such as its colour, its shape and so on and I learn that its 
main colour is green, that its architecture is inspired in the DNA molecular structure 
and that there’s some replicas of animals in the front of its entrance. So I invite a 
friend and both of us decided to go there by bike. As we get there closer, I focus on 
the buildings around to try finding out IB library. Suddenly I see it and I point to it 
using my finger and I utter  
 
(ut) That building is the IB library (let’s call it ut). 
 
I make sure that my friend can follow my finger and verify what I was 
pointing out at the moment I utter ut. I check that nothing is blocking his vision from 
his standpoint and then he answers “Yes, that building is where people study plants 
and animals” and change his direction towards the IB as well as I do. It means that 
he grasped the information I aimed to convey by my utterance. My utterance 
produced changes in my friend’s behavior in a way that he did what I planned for him 
to do. My token of that was effective and did its job of helping me to convey the 
information I aimed to my friend. 
In this example, some things happened. First I had a notion of IB, and I 
keep it in my mind. I could add information to it that might be relevant to the 
characterization of this object. The object from which I derived my notion is the 
source. Then based on the information stored in my notion I applied it later to an 
object that I believe it is the same as the source. This is the applicandum. And finally 
I planned to coordinate my friend’s notion and by using the token that I expected that 
he could achieve the same object I did. As we see, all this information game is about 
is to assure that the source is the applicandum. What was crucial was to make sure 
that the object I aimed to refer to was salient to him. By doing it I guarantee that the 
information encoded in my notion can flow and drive my friend to the right object. 
With the information in his hands, he can double-check with what he grasped from 
his perception in order to assure that the object in question is IB indeed. When the 
information flows and drives him to the object I aimed,  I gave the opportunity to my 
friend to figure out that a certain object that plays a certain role in his life at the 
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moment I tokened that building is IB library. This process influenced his decision to 
take the course of actions which resulted in directing his bicycle towards IB library. 
In the end of the day, my token of that building created a cognitive route 
for him to apply the notion he has and achieve the object at which I aimed. The way I 
planned my strategy to construe the cognitive route determines how successful the 
flow of information will be. In the McDonald’s example, Nicolas failed because he 
didn’t plan very well the path to provide his father with the appropriate cognitive route. 
The token he employed didn’t allow his father identify any object similar to a 
McDonald’s restaurant out of the cognitive route Nicolas has created. The information 
which flows from this cognitive route drove him to another object and it was bad for 
Nicolas’s hunger. 
1.4 Reflexive Content and Referential Content 
 
Reflexive content is the one of main contribution among the semanticists 
who wants to account for problems concerning informativeness, specially Frege’s 
Puzzle cases. Perry’s aim is to take some elements from Kaplan’s and Burk’s 
proposal about different aspects of an utterance with respect to meaning and create 
his own proposal in order to account for the impact of the utterance on the speaker’s 
cognition. He sums up what, according to Burk, comprehends five aspects 
concerning an utterance of an indexical, as follows: 
The token that is produced and which occupies a certain spatio-temporal point 
and belongs to a certain type; 
1. The relations the token holds with the elements of the context; 
2. The type meaning associated with the expression, that is provided by the 
type; 
3. The indexical meaning, which is the result of the combination between the 
type meaning and the token; 
4. The information conveyed (or proportionated) by the token.13 
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I will focus on item 5 because it’s where Perry’s innovation takes place. 
Perry implements some changes in this taxonomy. What Burks calls type meaning 
Perry calls simply meaning and what Burks calls indexical meaning Perry calls 
reflexive content.  In Burk’s taxonomy, the information conveyed would be what Perry 
ascribes to what is said, or the content we intuitively ascribe to any given utterance, 
that content the technical literature usually calls singular proposition. Perry labels this 
content referential content. However, the main idea is that the reflexive and 
referential content play a role in the speakers’ cognition and, for this reason, both of 
them matter to map the information conveyed by an utterance. 
Suppose that Nicolas and I say, at the same time, “I’m going home now”. 
Let’s call my utterance u¹ and his u² and focus on the indexical I tokened by me and 
Nicolas. The meaning of the token is the rule which governs its type, in this case, the 
rule whose content gives the token the following commandment: given the utterance 
u, refer to the agent of u. The reflexive content is the combination of the meaning of I 
and the tokens in u¹ and u². So the reflexive meaning of the I¹ and I²  is the  agent (or 
the speaker) who uttered I¹ and the agent who uttered I², respectively. Those 
contents contain the tokens themselves as part of their content and, for this reason, 
they are taken to be reflexive. It means that the reflexive content of u¹ and u² are 
different because each one contains different tokens, although their meaning are the 
same. On other hand, the referential content is when a singular proposition can be 
expressed by u1 and u2. And, in addition to it, the information conveyed is the result 
of this process and is different because u¹ is an utterance about me and u² is an 
utterance about Nicolas, that is, u¹ is true only if Gustavo (me) is going home at the 
time t1 and place p1 and u² is true only if Nicolas (my friend) is going home at the time 
t2 and place p2. It means that the information conveyed is different because u¹ and u² 
encode different truth-conditions. 
The innovation, however, is that the information conveyed may not be just 
the referential content but it can also be derived from the reflexive content. This multi-
level approach allows us to account for situations in which referential content 
demands too much from the speakers to be in position to have a belief about the 
singular proposition, if anything, in their conversational/communicational practice. In 
the case of my utterance u¹, the reflexive content associated with it is this: 
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(Pr1) The speaker of u¹ is going home at the time and place of u¹. 
 
It’s quite different from the referential content, which is the content resulted 
from the application of the conditions presented in Pr1: 
 
(P1) Gustavo is going home at 4:03 pm, May 1 2017. 
 
Both are propositions that embody truth-conditions of u¹. Perry defends 
that instead of thinking the truth-conditions of an utterance as a single content, he 
argues that they should be relativized to different facts related to the utterance. So, in 
hi s view, the right way to approach an utterance in terms of its truth-conditions is not 
asking “what are the truth-conditions of this utterance?” but “what are the truth-
conditions of it given such and such facts?”.14 Pr1 and P1 proportionate different 
truth-conditions because they’re connected with different facts about u¹. Pr1 encodes 
the condition in which u¹ would be true given the fact that u¹ is an utterance, given 
that the agent of the context is going somewhere at the time of u1. P1, however, 
encodes the condition in which u¹ would be true given the fact that Gustavo is the 
referent of Gustavo and he is going home at 4:03 pm in May 1 2017. Truth-
conditions, thus, are important tools to enable speakers to achieve different levels of 
understanding when they are in face of utterances. 
The reflexive content is not, of course, the best candidate for what is said, 
because it is not speakers’ goal, in their communicative practices, to say something 
like Pr1 when I uttered u¹. But it’s a valuable content which helps speakers to achieve 
such understanding state of utterances they are used to meet in contexts of 
communication. Suppose that you’re a foreign guy in Germany who don’t know a 
single word in German and you stopped by in front a store with a huge picture of Pelé 
fading away the goalkeeper and almost scoring against Uruguay in 1970 World Cup. 
Suddenly some guy stop nearby you also and says: 
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(6) Ich sah Pelé an diesem Tag spielen. 
 
You got stuck by it and in order to avoid making things worse you just nod 
your head. You don’t know anything about German, but given facts which surround 
his utterance and which rise from the context, like his gesture of pointing to the 
picture and thumbing up when he uttered (6) indicates that he’s saying something 
about Pelé.  
The question to be answered, then, is “what are facts in virtue of which (6) 
could be true?” and the answer it’s the provision of truth-conditions for the utterance 
given the facts that the context proportionated. Since there are levels of contents 
speakers can grasp, you know at least that the following conditions have to be 
accomplished in order that (6) comes to be true: 
 
(T6*) Given that he is linguistically competent speaker and aimed at 
meaning something true by uttering (6), (6) will be true iff the person 
represented by the picture he pointed out satisfies what is attributed to him 
by means of those words the German guy employed in (6). 
 
Maybe more details might be added to T6*, but we can say that the 
conditions it comprehends are part of the minimal requirements for the truth of (6) to 
be obtained. Of course the German guy didn’t mean T6* when he uttered (6). But it 
provides those conditions for (6) to be true given the fact that (6) is an utterance, 
which is valuable for someone who doesn’t know anything about (6) except that it’s 
an utterance. This diversity of truth-conditions mirror the variety of facts which 
surround the utterances speakers can entertain. If I see the same German guy 
reproducing some sounds near me, I assume that those sounds are words in 
German and that he’s a German competent speaker who means something using 
those sounds. The truth-conditions I would have access would be quite similar to T6*. 
But if I knew few words in German so that I could understand what he uttered, I 
would know that he was saying that he was in person at the match Pelé was depicted 
by that photo. Your knowledge of the language plus the knowledge about football 
facts allows you to grasp the following condition: 
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(T6**) (6) is true iff that German guy saw Pelé playing during a specific 
day. 
 
But if we restrict truth-conditions of (6) to conditions like T6**, a great deal 
of speakers’ understanding will be threaten. Only who are epistemically privileged will 
be considered as capable of understanding utterances like (6). But the idea is that 
other less privileged speakers are also able to access truth-conditions which explain 
their belief attitudes toward the utterances they meet. 
Let’s explore it a bit more. Let’s take the English version of (6) doing few 
adaptations which doesn’t compromise what is said: 
  
(7) I saw Pelé playing that day. 
 
Any competent English speaker who listens to (7) knows that (7) is an 
utterance made in English containing words from which no important ambiguities 
arise. As competent speakers, the first content they are able to grasp is the content 
which embodies the conditions about the utterance itself, which says that 7 is true 
only if the following is satisfied: 
 
(T7*) The agent of the context saw a person who is referred by the name 
Pelé playing at a given time t and place p. 
  
The more speakers get informed of relevant facts about the utterance, the 
more they enhance their understanding about it. Further steps could be made at this 
level and show how more accurate truth-conditions can be built as those facts get 
into the stage. Suppose that the German guy is called Heinrich. So if some speaker 
who is his friend and knows lots of things about football, including the fact that Pelé 
played that World Cup, then he would have access to the content (T7*r) if he were in 
that situation of Pelé’s picture: 
  
(T7*r) Heinrich saw Pelé playing that day. 
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Those speakers achieve a level that allows them to grasp the singular 
proposition expressed by (7). But not everyone is privileged epistemically in a way 
that they achieve such a level. In fact, in many circumstances our level of 
understanding is limited to the reflexive content. So even though there are lots of 
circumstances in which speakers face poverty of information, they still have to be 
able to build truth-conditions in order to achieve some understanding. In other words, 
there should be minimal truth-conditions available for speakers so they can be able to 
produce a belief, otherwise they couldn’t even be able to produce any believe if they 
were before an utterance. If there are many truth-conditions which speakers are not 
even to grasp single component of it because they are ignorant of real world facts, 
the best explanation for being able to produce a belief even in these circumstances is 
to hold the capacity of grasping truth-conditions which simply rely on their linguistic 
competence and reflexive content plays an important role for this task to be 
accomplished. 
1.5 That is That and the concept of notion applied 
 
Let me use a similar example that Perry uses in Reference and Reflexivity. 
Suppose I’m walking on the street and suddenly I see something which looks like a 
dog behind a column in a way that I can only see the head and the tail of the dog. So 
I say:  
 
(9) That dog is that dog 
 
At first glance, someone could say that the informativeness of (9) depends 
on the objects the expressions tokened refer to. So, in this view, the information 
conveyed depends on how many dogs are referred to. Suppose I pointed out the dog 
twice, first into the head and second into the nail using each demonstrative at time. In 
this scenario, I say something true, so nothing wrong with my utterance of (9), but (9) 
would be trivially informative, because 
 
32 
 
a) Despite I pointed out two different parts of the animal (thus tokening two 
different sub-utterances towards different directions) the expressions I 
tokened encode the same information, which is the dog in question; 
b) What I ended up saying is that that dog I’m pointing out is identical to itself, 
which says nothing relevant in terms of information value. 
 
If there were two dogs though, (9) would be false and quite absurd, for I 
would be saying that two different dogs are one and the same animal, which is 
something inconsistent. The transmission of information would fail then. 
In the first scenario, if there was only one dog, I would end up saying 
something true, but again, something trivially true, which means that nothing really 
informative is conveyed by (9) in this case. If there were two dogs though, in a 
second scenario, nothing promising comes out as well, because I would be saying 
something false. Let’s call the dog I pointed out to the nail and the head Fido. So, 
when I uttered (9), I expressed something trivially true, as follows: 
  
(P9*) Fido is Fido, which can be rephrased as, (P9*) Fido is identical to 
itself. 
  
But when I utter (9) in the case in which each part belongs to different 
dogs, let’s say Fido and Dido, the individual I ended up pointing out using one of the 
demonstratives is not Fido any longer, but Dido, and the information conveyed is 
different because the proposition expressed is pretty different from (P9*), which looks 
like this: 
 
(P9**) Fido is Dido. 
 
So the moral of this little story is that taking these two scenarios 
informativeness is not achieved because, according to this semantic view, either I 
ended up conveying something trivial or something completely absurd. So if 
informativeness were tied to the singular proposition, we couldn’t explain the 
relevance of employing two different demonstratives in (9). 
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An example we can exploit a bit more is what Perry calls Austin’s tubes.15 I 
will give my own version of the example in order to make things easier to explain. 
Suppose Nicolas is looking at the landscape with his binocular and he focus his eyes 
on in a way that he sees a bunch of trees but by means of its lens and, thus, from 
different perspective, and the middle of it there is a little group of skyscrapers in front 
of his vision. Then, just to double-checking what he knows, he says 
 
(10) This is this (referring to the bunch of trees that appears on his right 
and); 
(11) That is that (referring to the bunch of tree that appears on his left) 
 
He points to the bunch he sees through the lens using one demonstrative 
and the other he uses when he looks at the bunch without the binocular. Suppose 
that there’s no trouble with his directing intentions, which means that the referring 
mechanics of the demonstratives tokened works fine. Nevertheless, unbeknownst 
what he’s actually seeing is the same bunch of trees because the position his 
binocular stays makes him think he is in front of two very similar bunches of trees. 
Thus, Nicolas doesn’t believe (12) 
 
(12) This is that 
 
Let’s call the bunch of treeTree-Bunch just for making the explanation 
easier. Said that, the following facts seem to be the case: 
 
a) If any speaker who utters u believes what u express, then Nicolas 
believes what he utters when he utters 10 and 11. 
b) If Nicolas utters 10, Nicolas believes that Tree-Bunch is Tree-Bunch 
c) If Nicolas utters 11, Nicolas believes that Tree-Bunch is Tree-Bunch 
d) The proposition expressed by 12 is that Tree-Bunch is Tree-Bunch 
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e) Then if Nicolas believes what 10 and 11 express, Nicolas would also 
believe what 12 expresses. 
f) Nicolas doesn’t believe what 12 expresses. 
 
As we can see, a-f is an incompatible set of statements, which means that 
not all of them can be jointly true. It could be the case that Nicolas figures out, even 
easily, just few seconds later, that (10) and (11) is in fact about the same object, 
which would lead him to give his approval to (12) too. But those few seconds he got 
stuck by thinking that (10) and (11) are true but (12) false (or at least doubtful) is 
enough to put him in trouble and make him conclude that (10) and (11) don’t express 
the same content. If Nicolas believes (10) and (11) are true, he doesn’t do it by the 
same reason, because if he had done it by grasping the same content he wouldn’t 
deny that (12) is true either. It means that his behavior towards (12) is the footprint for 
us to figure out that he didn’t believe in (10) and (11) convey the same information, 
which entails that he grasp different truth-conditions from them.  
However, there’s no room for some difference among (10), (11), and (12) 
to arise at the referential level, because if we appeal to the singular proposition TB 
 
(TB) The Tree-Bunch is the Tree Bunch 
 
All the utterances encode exactly the same content and, thus, each one 
embodies the same truth-conditions. The referential content of (10), (11) and (12), 
thus, don’t bring anything interesting to us in terms of information, because all of 
them are equally saying that a tree bunch is identical to itself. Nevertheless, at the 
reflexive level we can find different contents, which can be represented as follows: 
 
(Pr*10) That the object pointed out by this¹ in 10 is the object pointed out by 
this² in 10; 
(Pr*11) That the object pointed out by that¹ in 11 is the object pointed out by 
that² in 11; 
(Pr*12) That the object pointed out by this³ in 12 is the object pointed out by 
that³ in 12. 
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As we see, the reflexive content of (10), (11) and (12) are different and can 
be useful for account for the different informative values conveyed by (10), (12) and 
(11). Notice that (10) has two different tokens of this, each one is associated with a 
different demonstration, which means that the reflexive content of (10) is built upon 
different components. Likewise (11) contains two different tokens of that, which 
means that at the reflexive level (11) conveys something quite different from (10). 
And the same also occurs with (12), since the reflexive content it expresses contains 
different constituents from (10) and (11). Moreover, because each token is 
individually associated with a specific demonstration, we can say that each token is 
linked to a different mode of presentation, or so to speak, to a perceptual mode of 
presentation. I will use the term perceptual buffer to characterize the perception that 
the speaker has when each demonstrative is tokened in a certain utterance. So when 
Nicolas utters (10), he produces two different buffers r1 and r2, where r1 is associated 
with the token this1 and r2 with this2. And the same process occurs with (11) and (12). 
The lesson we learn from it is that Nicolas has created two distinct cognitive routes 
for each utterance he produced and, for this reason, the reflexive content of (10), 
(11), and (12), based on the tokens they contain, are informative. 
But how can we explain the fact that Nicolas even though taking (10) and 
(11) as conveying different pieces of information, he takes (10) and (11) individually 
as trivial? The concept of notion is useful here to handle this issue. The tokens of this 
in (10) are associated each one with a specific demonstrative act and, thus, with a 
distinct perceptual buffer. And the same thing also occurs in (11): the tokens of that in 
(11) are associated (each one) with a specific perceptual buffer and a specific 
demonstration. However, those two perceptual buffers are stored in the same notion 
n and n* respectively by Nicolas. The perceptual buffers (r1, r2) that Nicolas produced 
by uttering (10), are gathered in the same notion n, whereas the perceptual buffers 
(r1*, r2*) he produced by uttering (11) are gathered in n*. So the reflexive contents 
based on the notions which Nicolas has are: 
 
(N*10) That n is n 
(N*11) That n* is n* 
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(N*12) That n is n* 
 
Despite (10) has two different tokens, this¹ and this², and then, with each 
one associated with a singular perceptual buffer, they are stored in the same notion 
n, which explains why Nicolas takes it trivial. The notion n merges the two cognitive 
routes created by the buffers linked to that¹ and that² in a single information pack, 
which makes Nicolas understand it as conveying the same information. Same thing 
occurs with (11), the tokens that¹ and that² and their buffers are gathered with n* and, 
for this reason, Nicolas ended up taking those tokens in (11) to convey the same 
information. Nevertheless, since the notions in N*12 are different, Nicolas got stuck at 
giving approval to (12). The notions n and n* creates two different information packs, 
which makes Nicolas produce different belief attitudes towards the tokens contained 
in (12). 
Notice that the difference N*10 and N*11 is fine-grained enough to 
distinguish (10) from (11) and to accommodate the triviality embodied by (10) and 
(11) taken one by one. As utterances can encode several truth-conditions, (10) and 
(11) can present different levels of reflexive content as well. The Pr*10 and Pr*11 
provide us with the reflexive contents which Nicolas has before merging the 
perceptual buffers r1  and r2  into n and r1* and r2* into n*. 
Now we can go back to the dog’s case. The aim is to explain the 
informativeness that can raise from (9). The issue is to explain the relevance behind 
(9) so that we can provide the explanation for Nicolas conveying something 
informative by means of (9). First we can take the reflexive content based on the 
tokens. The first is to look at the reflexive content of (9). As (9) has two tokens of the 
demonstrative that dog, the reflexive content involving them will be as follows? 
 
(Pr*9) That the individual pointed by that dog1 is the individual pointed by 
that dog2 
 
Each token is associated with a specific demonstration and, thus, for each 
token Nicolas has produced a distinct perceptual buffer: one to the token that dog1 
and other to the token that dog2. Let’s call them b and b*. since that dog1  is 
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individualized by b and that dog2 is individualized by b*, the information value of (9) 
comes from those distinct buffers that the tokens that dog1 and that dog2 are based 
on. But how can Nicolas take (9) as being trivial? This is done by taking notions into 
account. 
The second move is to provide the reflexive content in terms of the notions 
Nicolas has produced. In this case, as Nicolas considers that there is only one dog, 
he connects the two tokens of that dog in (9) with the same notion, which is 
responsible for store information. By doing it, he merges the buffers b and b* into a 
single notion n and the truth-conditions given in terms of the notion Nicolas has 
entertained get this form as follows, where m is this notion Nicolas entertains in his 
mind: 
 
(M9) That m is m. 
 
As this reflexive content containing m has no different constituents beyond 
m, it explains the Nicolas’s attitude of taking (9) as trivial. 
But now consider a second speaker, João, who is looking at Nicolas 
seeing things on his binocular. The demonstratives Nicolas tokened provide João 
with distinct cognitive routes. Nicolas, as a speaker who seeks to collaborate to the 
conversation he engage with, wouldn’t decide to utter something if it weren’t 
something relevant to the conversational environment in which he is. So if he uttered 
(9), he should have meant something informative. However, as far as we can see, 
M9 seems innocuous to explain his act of uttering (9) attempting to convey something 
informative. The explanation is that João creates two different notions m and m*, 
each one associated with one demonstrative tokened in (9), as follows: 
 
(M*9) That m is m* 
 
João, differently from Nicolas, keeps the buffers b and b* separated and it 
makes João not treating the first token of that dog as providing the same information 
as the second one. As Nicolas wouldn’t have said anything if he hadn’t seen 
something relevant in saying (9), there should be a content Nicolas had access that 
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explains the informativeness encoded by (9). M*9 is the truth-conditions whose 
constituents differ from each other, which means that M*9 is the truth-conditions 
containing the two different notions responsible for that dog tokens being 
individuated. 
So now we have the following architecture: m and m* are each one 
associated with different perceptual buffers, namely b and b*. Each token of that dog 
causes different cognitive impact on João’s cognition because each one is connected 
with a different notion. Those notions create different information pack and keep the 
different cognitive routes separated. Thus, those cognitive routes provide that dog¹ 
and that dog² with different cognitive significance and allow us to explain why (9) can 
be informative for João. 
Many times the audience are not able to achieve such content, neither the 
speaker, but informativeness continue to be present and, for this reason, there 
should be a content, available for the speaker to fill the gap left by the referential 
content. The moral of the story is that the information conveyed is not always 
provided by what is said. 
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2. Co-reference de jure, Factivity and Mental Files 
2.1 Factivity and its counter-examples 
 
In Semantic Relationism, Fine proposes a special case of co-reference, 
which he calls strict co-reference, which can be defined as the type of co-reference in 
which the speaker cannot reasonably doubt about the very relation of co-reference 
that the terms he meets hold with each other. Strict co-reference is given in virtue of 
the meaning of the terms involved only, so it should be part of the speaker’s linguistic 
competence that any two co-referential terms are so if they strictly co-refer. For 
example, if the speaker uses the name Cicero to refer to the Roman author and then 
applies it again (producing a second token of it) with the intention of referring to the 
same person referred to by the first token, then the speaker has the plan of 
continuing the chain of reference created by the introduction of the Cicero. So, in this 
case, it is part of the speaker’s linguistic knowledge that those two tokens of Cicero 
refer to the same person, regardless of whether the speaker knows what person they 
specifically and truly refer. Fine says that the relation of co-reference in this case 
rests upon the linguistic meaning of the terms involved only in the sense that the only 
content needed to be aware of the fact of co-reference is the linguistic rules which 
govern the terms deployed. So roughly it’s this sense that Fine takes to be that 
feature of being co-referential only in virtue of linguistic meaning and by which he 
characterizes strict co-reference.16 So strict co-reference is the co-reference which 
speaker knows in virtue of his linguistic competence. 
Strict co-reference presents another feature. It is factive. It means that the 
relation of co-reference cannot fail to hold, otherwise strict co-reference couldn’t be 
characterized as knowledge and this very relation would be flaw. The idea behind the 
factive feature is that since the relation of strict co-reference is a kind of knowledge, it 
cannot be about falsehoods because knowledge is only about truths. If we assume, 
for the sake of the argument, that the definition of knowledge as the justified true 
belief is correct, then truth is a necessary condition to knowledge. For example, the 
act of discovering involves the agent and the object of discovery, which is a 
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proposition if we interpret this relation as a propositional attitude. In this case, it 
doesn’t make sense to say that I discover that the moon is made of green cheese, 
because we can only discover things which are true. So discovery, like knowledge, is 
factive in that sense: it’s not possible that an agent S discovers that p and p is false. 
The factive aspect of strict co-reference is labeled as Factivity by Recanati 
(2017) and is given by the following clause:  
  
(Factivity) If two terms strict co-refer then they co-refer17 
 
Factivity is an important feature of strict co-reference because co-
reference is a necessary condition to two terms strictly co-refer according to this 
characterization. But there are cases in which the terms don’t co-refer, although the 
speaker internally takes them to be co-referential by applying them with the intention 
of continuing the same chain of reference. Those cases are presented by Recanati in 
his Mental Files in Flux and co-reference de jure is the way he call strict co-reference, 
that is, the type of co-reference whose knowledge is guaranteed by the linguistic 
competence of the speaker. So what Fine calls strict co-reference Recanati calls co-
reference de jure. Recanati argues that these cases threaten Factivity and suggests 
that the way Fine characterizes co-reference de jure is not a good way for defining it. 
Recanati works on two cases, one involving fictional terms and the other involving 
terms which the speaker is confused about their reference. 
Suppose that I talking about Sherlock Holmes’s adventures and say 
something like (0): 
 
(0) Sherlock Holmes is very smart. He uses inductive reasoning to make 
surprising discoveries. 
 
In (0) I used a token of the name Sherlock Holmes (SH) and its reference 
does not exist. However, as a competent speaker, if I used the pronoun he 
anaphorically, I have no doubts that they co-refer. But since SH does not refer, how 
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can we say that they co-refer? When fictional terms are deployed the speaker casts 
no doubts about the relation of co-reference between those terms, nevertheless they 
don’t co-refer because they don’t refer at all, since they are fictional names. This is 
the first problem Recanati casts on the way Fine defines co-reference de jure. The 
other case also involves anaphora, but the difference is that it involves two speakers 
and one of them is confused about the reference of the terms deployed. In the follow 
section I will work on this second case. 
2.2 Anaphora and Wally-Zach’s case 
 
In Mental Files in Flux, Recanati works with a example which involves two 
speakers in a dialogue. Suppose that there’s a dialogue between two guys, Wally 
and Zach, two English competent speakers, when Suddenly Wally sees his friend 
Udo crossing the street and he says  
 
(1) He really needs a haircut. 
 
Zach looks at the little manifold of guys crossing the street at that time and 
targeting another guy who also catches his attention because of hair issues he says  
 
(2) He sure does.18 
 
In this case we have two different uses of the pronoun he: the first 
employment, made by Wally, is a demonstrative use and the second, made by Zach, 
is also an demonstrative, but at the same time it works as an anaphoric pronoun also 
since its purpose is to take the referent of Wally’s token of he, whatever it comes to 
be. It would be a perfect anaphoric use if Zach hadn’t misled the referent of the 
Wally’s token of he on which his anaphoric relies. Internally, the co-reference is taken 
for granted by Zach, but the problem is the referent they attain according to which 
speaker’s intention we take into account. In scheme below the coordination of the 
Wally’s and Zach’s tokens is presented: 
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Take hew1 and hew2 the way Wally represent in his mind the terms tokened 
in (1) and (2) and hez1 and hez2 the way Zach represent the same tokens in his mind. 
Wally takes them to be co-referential de jure, meaning that Wally cast no doubts on 
whether they are co-referential or not. Internally, in Wally’s perspective, they co-refer 
de jure. The same thing with Zach’s perspective: they are co-referential de jure. But 
the pairs in which the lines are crossed out in the picture above are those pairs of 
tokens that are not co-referential because their referents are different, because 
whereas the pair (hew1 hew2) refer to Udo the pair (hez1 hez2) refer to other person he 
thought it was Udo. But if we have a situation in which speakers cast no doubts on 
whether the terms co-refer, nevertheless these terms don’t actually co-refer, we are 
in trouble, according to Recanati, because it is mandatory that the speakers’ tokens 
be co-referential to co-reference de jure to hold based on the way Fine characterized 
it. 
Recanati’s idea is that co-reference de jure should be independent of 
whether the co-referential terms really co-refer or not. He thinks that this relationship 
can hold even when no actual co-reference holds. So, how come? Recanati argues 
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that there are other relations of co-reference than actual co-reference that can work 
as the model for the base relation on which the notion of co-reference de jure should 
rely. 
He separates co-reference de jure from the mere internal state in which 
the speaker is when he takes two terms to be co-referential de jure by calling it 
internal co-reference. According to him, internal co-reference can be rendered in 
terms of CDJ state (co-reference jure state), which can be stated as follows: 
 
(CDJ state): an agent is in CDJ state with respect to two expression M and 
N just in case the agent takes M and N as to be co-referential and 
disposed to trade the reference of those terms upon identity.19 
 
As we’ve seen, there’re cases in which the agent is in a CDJ state even 
when no actual co-reference exists. In other words, in these situations the speakers 
would only hold belief about the co-reference, but not knowledge of this relationship. 
However, Recanati argues that the speaker can know something even if he is in the 
CDJ state in cases of emptiness and confusion of the reference, as he says 
 
There is, I claim, something which the speaker in the CDJ state (and anyone 
who understands the discourse) knows about the relation in which the two 
terms stand to each other. More precisely: there is a relation R such that, 
when the speaker is in the CDJ state with respect to a pair of terms M and N, 
he or she (and anyone who understands the discourse) knows that M and N 
stand in relation R.
20
 
 
The base relation R is the co-reference relation about which the speaker 
would have knowledge even in cases in which the speaker is confused about their 
referents. In other words, whatever the base relation R might be, it should be 
knowable if we want to characterize co-reference de jure using it. This is a definition 
of co-reference de jure given by Recanati: 
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M and N are co-referential de jure =def the speaker is in a CDJ state with respect to M 
and N and anyone who properly understands the discourse involving M and N knows 
that M and N are under the base relation R.21 
 
The base relation should be transparent to the speaker, since co-reference 
de jure contains the co-reference relation which the speaker must know it holds. But 
in this excerpt below Fine seems to throw it away when he differs co-reference de 
jure from merely internal co-reference. 
 
Suppose we take two singular terms to be putatively co-referential if it is a 
putative semantic requirement that they co-refer. Then the relation of 
putative co-reference is likewise not factive; two terms can putatively co-refer 
without co-referring. And so there is no obstacle - or, at least, not the same 
obstacle - to taking this relation to be the relation of internal co-reference in 
cases of confused reference.
22
 
 
Of course this strategy allows Fine to keep co-reference de jure away from 
the threat raised by emptiness or confusion of reference, because what he’s saying is 
that co-reference de jure holds just in case the referential terms involved actually co-
refer. But doing so, he ended up assuming that there are cases in which the speaker 
doesn’t know whether he is before a case of co-reference relation or not. The 
speaker thinks that there’s strict co-reference when there’s not. What Fine can 
guarantees then pursuing this strategy is just a partial transparency, which can be put 
as follows: 
 
(Partial Transparency) If M and N strictly co-refer, the speaker knows that 
they co-refer. 
 
But once the kind of co-reference relation we are looking for is totally 
transparent for the speaker, and not only partially transparent, the following condition 
is not held by co-reference de jure as Fine has defined it: 
  
(Full Transparency) For any M and N, 
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a) if M and N co-refer de jure, the speaker knows they co-refer 
b) if M and N don’t co-refer de jure , the speaker knows they don’t co-
refer. 
 
It doesn’t hold because there are cases in which (b) are false, as Fine 
himself admits.  
So if the speaker, in any situation in which he is linguistically competent, 
must be able to evaluate whether any two expressions co-refer if they are co-
referential de jure, the way Fine defined co-reference de jure based on Factivity 
principle is not a good strategy, according to Recanati. His job, thus, is to find other 
base relation R rather than actual co-reference. 
2.3 Weakening the base relation R 
 
Take a look at this second characterization that Recanati gives: 
 
M and N are co-referential de jure =def the speaker is in a CDJ state with 
respect to M and N and anyone who properly understands the discourse 
involving M and N knows that they co-refer if they refer at all.23 
 
This definition of co-reference de jure has a conditional as its base relation 
R now and there’s a discussion about existential import behind the inclusion of this 
conditional which is due to Fine. Fine gives a more promising response when he 
notices that co-reference can be defined using different quantifiers. One way is 
defining co-reference between M and N existentially as  x(Ref(N, x) ^ Ref(M, x)), 
where Ref denotes the property of an expression referring to something, another is 
defining it universally as ∀x(Ref(N, x) <==> Ref(M, x)). Given that the referent is the 
same when M and N are co-referential, both definitions are the equivalent when 
those terms co-refer.24 But the definition which uses universal quantifier has an 
advantage over the other definition. In the case of empty names, the better way to 
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talk about the co-reference relation is using the universal version because it doesn’t 
have existential import. It’s promising because it’s able to deal with cases involving 
empty names.  
The statement << M and N co-refer if they refer at all, for any referent 
of M and N >>, which is the translation of the co-reference with universal quantifier, 
is a conditional which has truth-conditions specified by classical logic. Let’s call this 
kind of co-reference conditional co-reference and let’s abbreviate the statement 
above to CR and its antecedent and consequent c and r respectively. So the truth-
table of CR follows below: 
 
Let c: <<if M and N refer>>,  
r: << M and N co-refer>>, for any referent of M and N. 
 
c r CR 
V V V 
F V V 
V F F 
F F V 
 
Because of it, if M and N are empty at most its antecedent c will be false, 
which doesn’t interfere in the truth of the conditional CR, because it continues to be 
true even when c is false. Moreover, it’s not possible for the consequent r to be false 
while the antecedent c is true. The reason is that if M and N are empty, they don’t 
refer neither co-refer, since if they don’t actually refer they also don’t co-refer. It 
means that whenever c is false, r will necessarily be false as well. On the other hand, 
the speaker will always know the truth expressed by CR if M and N refer at all. Thus, 
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this knowledge doesn’t need that the terms involved in fact co-refer in order to be 
held. 
 But the case involving confusion of reference keeps tough to handle, 
because it is the case in which the terms refer, but they don’t hold co-refer, which 
leads us to a scenario in which c is true and r is false, entailing that CR is false. If we 
rephrase  CR in formal language, we can put it as follows: 
 
∀x(Ref(N, x) <==> Ref(M, x)). 
 
When we apply this definition to the Wally-Zach case and the pronouns 
tokened we can have the follow formal statement: 
  
∀x(Ref(hew, x) <==> Ref(hez, x)), where hew is the token of Wally and hez 
the token of Zach 
 
As hew doesn’t refer to the same individual as hez refers, but to different 
person, it makes CR false and put in risk the possibility of CR works as the base 
relation for co-reference de jure.25 
The strategy presented by Recanati includes a little modification in the 
reading of CR. According to him, CR will be true if we read the antecedent c as 
meaning << if they both refer at all >>. The inclusion of both forces c to be true just 
in case all the referring expressions refer and false in all other possible situations, 
which means if one of the the referential expressions fails to refer, it is enough to 
make c and guarantees CR to be true.26 If we can show that in Wally-Zach example 
one of the pronouns in fact fails to refer, we can guarantee that CR is true even in 
this scenario. So CR as the new base relation R aims to deal with the following 
scenarios involving M and N and their different co-reference relations:  
 
1. M and N refer to the same object 
2. M and N are empty 
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3. M refers and N fails 
4. M refers to one object and N to another 
 
The scenarios 1 and 2 we already know that CR holds, since in these 
cases its antecedent c will inevitably be true 3. In the scenario 3, CR is also true if we 
accept the reading of c we explained above. The only scenario that remains troubling 
is 4. The world given by 4 is ruled out by CR since the terms M and N can refer but 
standing for different things. In that world, the antecedent c is true but the 
consequent r is false, which makes CR false and it threats the possibility of co-
reference de jure if this scenario is not neutralized. But according to Recanati, 4 
shouldn’t really scare us as a problem because it’s impossible to occur when the 
speaker is in a CDJ state.27 
 If we take this issue more carefully, it seems it’s not possible to a 
speaker to be in a CDJ state with respect to M and N and those terms refer to 
different things. If the speaker is in a circumstance in which he fails in the use of a 
referring expression that he takes to be co-referential de jure, that expression it’s 
deployed exactly to continue the chain of reference. It entails that if the term M is 
introduced and the speaker uses the term N with the intention of continuing the chain 
of reference, but he ends up referring to other person, N is considered as a failure in 
referring. 
Suppose that the speaker tokened the same demonstrative he twice to 
refer to the same individual that was before him at some distance. So first he picks 
out the individual with his token he1 and then few seconds later he produces his token 
he2 to refer to the same individual, but unbeknownst he ends up referring to another 
guy because his he2 is followed by a gesture of him which makes other individual 
salient and, thus, makes he2 refer to that individual. There is no doubt that from the 
external point of view, the speaker referred to one guy with he1 and to another with 
he2. But if we take into account the speaker’s intention of explicitly continuing the 
chain of reference, he2 fails in its task of referring because the speaker aimed to refer 
to the person referred by he1 but ends up referring to the individual that became 
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salient in the context. We can read this scenario defending that token he2 refers to 
the person that belongs to the chain of the reference introduced by he1 and to the 
person that was salient within the context. This violates the task of referring, since if it 
is considered a failure of reference if the referential term stands for no individual or if 
it stands for more than one individual. So when the speaker is confused in a scenario 
in which he takes two terms as co-referential de jure, one of the tokens deployed can 
be read as failing in its task of referring. So the scenario described by 4 is a 
impossible situation if we take into account that the speaker take the referential terms 
as being co-referential de jure. 
If 4 is impossible, all the cases of confusion as described above falls under 
the world described by 2 or 3. It means that co-reference de jure containing CR as 
the base relation R accommodates all the possible worlds involving the co-reference 
relation between M and N. Once there’s no case in which that base relation R gets in 
trouble, co-reference de jure based on CR can be said factive. 
2.4 Coordinated propositions and Mental Files 
 
The second approach is the idea that the co-reference de jure is not 
derived from semantic features, but primarily from cognitive constraints. This is 
reading that Recanati contends: the thesis that there are cognitive constraints upon 
which co-reference de jure builds and these constraints are the responsible for . To 
do so he explores his idea of mental files. So in the follow section I will first show 
Fines’s proposal of coordinated propositions and then the critique that Recanati 
makes. Then I will show how his critique fails basing my argument on the tools with 
which Perry provide us. 
2.4.1 Fine’s notion of coordinated propositions 
 
Fine argues that terms manifest some properties only as pair of 
expressions. Co-referential terms taken isolated express the same content, but when 
they are put together they manifest features that each taken isolatedly doesn’t 
manifest. The terms Cicero and Tulio, for example, has the same semantic 
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contribution. But when they are taken in a pairwise way with other pairs containing 
only tokens of Cicero, those pairs are distinct from each other. Intrinsically there’s 
nothing which distinguish them, but when they are paired some features appear in 
virtue of this relationship of pairing each other. Since they don’t have any other 
content other than their referent, those relational features that appear can be 
exploited to account for the difference between the pairs Cicero-Tulio and Cicero-
Cicero, according to Fine.  
The relational feature which rises from the pairs of co-referential terms is 
coordination. According to Fine, coordination is the relation that holds between two 
terms are paired in the same piece of discourse and determines whether they 
represent the referent as the same or not. In the case of co-referential terms, two co-
referential terms are positively coordinated if and only if they represent their referent 
as the same and negatively if they don’t. Regardless whether you actually know that 
Cicero is Tully, anyone who understands a piece of discourse containing those terms 
can sensibly raise the question whether they refer to the same individual. If so, those 
terms are negatively coordinated. On the other hand, if two terms are tokened and 
one of them is so with the intention of continuing the chain of reference, then they are 
positively coordinated, because no one who understand any piece of discourse which 
contains those tokens would raise the question whether they co-refer.28 Suppose you 
hear from your professor in your literature class that “Cicero is orator” and in the 
same class that “Cicero is also an clever philosopher”. Since this piece of discourse 
contains elements which makes evident that the professor’s intention of referring to 
the same guy, his audience wouldn’t raise question on whether the terms co-refer or 
not. As we have seen, when these cases happens, the terms are co-referential de 
jure. 
 Fine characterizes this understanding in terms of narrow sense and broad 
sense, which  leads to a second way of characterizing coordination. When two any 
terms co-refer jure, then Fine says that is a semantic requirement that the speaker 
knows that they co-refer.29 Semantic requirement is any linguistic element that must 
be known by any competent speaker, that is, is required that speaker knows it in 
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order to be considered linguistically competent. But it is a semantic requirement just 
in narrow sense, because the speaker might not know that the co-reference relation 
holds indeed. Those cases in which co-reference is opaque is characterized as 
semantic fact in broad sense. So since the fact that Cicero and Tully co-refer is not a 
semantic fact in the narrow sense, because there can be a speaker who is 
linguistically competent which can cast doubts on whether they co-refer or not, then 
they are negatively coordinated. Whereas Cicero and Cicero (another token) in a 
piece of discourse where one is tokened with the intention of continuing the chain of 
reference, is semantically required that they co-refer, which means that they are 
positively coordinated.30 
I’m reloading this discussion because I’m interested in one 
characterization Fine does in propositional level, which gives us a clue to understand 
what is the element responsible for letting co-reference de jure occurs and how it 
works in mind. Fine links the semantic feature given in terms of coordination to 
explain how the speaker’s cognition works to manifest his belief attitude. 
Coordination, according to Fine, is a key feature because it will determine 
whether co-reference de jure relation holds or not. As a semantic feature, 
coordination is mirrored in the propositional content, since otherwise it wouldn’t make 
sense to call it a semantic feature. So there should be a propositional content whose 
constituent is the coordination relation in which the co-referential terms are. Since not 
all sentences contain coordinated terms, sentences could present different 
propositional contents. In order to accommodate this difference derived from 
coordination, Fine makes a distinction between primary content and secondary 
content. Primary content is the singular proposition, composed by the very individual 
the proposition is about and the properties and relations this individual may satisfy. 
Secondary content is the singular proposition plus the coordination relation that holds 
of the co-referential terms.31 As we’ve seen, coordination is a special relation which 
holds of co-referential terms only, and could be positively and negatively coordinated. 
So take, for example, the sentence (3):  
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(3) Cicero admires Tully. 
 
And the representation of the propositions expressed by (3), according to 
Fines’s distinction: 
 
(P3)   
 
 
 
(P3*) 
 
 
 
The proposition P3 is the singular proposition expressed by (3) and, as we 
can see, is composed by the individual Cicero and the relation of admiration for 
himself. P3 corresponds to the primary content of (3). The proposition P3* is the 
proposition composed by Cicero, the relation of admiration for himself, and the 
relation of coordination between the terms contained in (3), in this case, Cicero and 
Tully. Because of it, P3* is responsible for the secondary content of (3), since it 
contains coordination as one of its constituents. Moreover, since it’s not semantically 
required that Cicero and Tully co-refer, the coordination contained in P3* is negative 
and, for this reason, P3* is called negatively coordinated proposition.32 
Of course, for sake of the best reading of this proposal, there doesn’t exist 
two instances of individuals, but only one, and this individual is in the relation of 
admiring with himself. On the other hand, the coordination relation is a relation which 
holds of the terms of the utterance, not by the individual himself. However, in the 
propositional representation, this relation is pictured as being the relation of the 
“instances” of the individual referred by each term. However, we should bear in mind 
that it’s just a picture of how things would be in propositional level and we should take 
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into account limitations that concern the way of representing this content. Now 
consider (4), 
 
(4) Cicero admires Cicero. 
 
P4 and P4* are representations of the propositions: 
 
 
(P4)   
 
 
(P4*) 
 
 
 
Similar to the characterization above, P4 is the singular proposition 
expressed by (4) and is exactly the same as that expressed by (3). But what makes 
them different is their coordinated propositions. P4* is a positive coordinated 
proposition because the terms tokened in (4) are such that it’s semantically required 
that the competent speaker knows that they co-refer. With this distinction, Fine 
pursues two things: tackling the informativeness issue without abandoning the 
Referentialist approach. The primary content explains why (3) and (4) encapsulate 
the same content, that is, the same semantic contribution, and the secondary content 
explains why they convey different information. 
Coordination can also occur in co-referential terms in different utterances. 
Take the following pair of sentences (5) and (6): 
 
(5) Cicero was an orator 
(6) Tully was the author of Against Catiline. 
 
The utterances are considered simple because each doesn’t contain co-
referential terms. The co-reference relation is held between the terms presented in 
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different sentences, in this case, (5) and (6). As each one contains solely one 
referential term, what each utterance expresses is just its singular proposition, and as 
we can see, they are different because they present different kinds of predicates, but 
both of them are satisfied by the same individual. However, in this case, the pair of 
singular propositions are negatively coordinated because is not a semantic 
requirement that the speaker knows that the terms Cicero and Tully co-refer in this 
piece of discourse. Nevertheless, if the terms were such that they were anaphora 
case or any other case of recurrence, they would be positively coordinated since it 
would be semantically required that the speaker knows that such terms co-refer. The 
coordination relation scheme could be represented as follows, showing us that this 
relation may not exist only within the same proposition, but also between different 
propositions. 
 
(P5)  
    
   
 
(P6)  
   
 
 
 
P5 and P6 are the singular propositions expressed by (5) and (6). The 
coordination relation between them would be something like the diagrams below, 
representing the negatively and positively coordinated propositions, respectively: 
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Thus, the idea behind coordination is that when co-referential terms are 
positively coordinated, they are transparent to any competent speaker who meet the 
utterances containing those terms in the same piece of discourse. But there should 
be something that happens in the speaker’s mental life that makes him do such a 
thing. The semantic constraint imposed by linguistic rules that govern the 
expressions he meets should be rendered in a cognitive constraint in order to cause 
impact on speaker’s cognition and make him manifest a certain belief attitude. 
Recanati argues that mental files provides us with a better model to explain what 
happens in the speaker’s cognition and contends that the coordination, in fact, 
derives from cognitive constraints. This relational approach answer the question “in 
virtue of what content (3) and (4) are different?”, but it doesn’t seem to explain what 
happens in the cognitive level so that the speaker manifest attitudinal difference over 
that pair of utterances. 
2.4.2 Mental Files and how mind works 
 
If two co-referential terms be positively coordinated, it must be impossible 
for the speaker to raise questions on whether they co-refer or not. Positively 
coordinated terms means that the speaker is semantically required (by rules derived 
from the language that his  competent then) to take the terms as representing the 
same object.33 Let’s get back to the discussion of strict co-reference focusing on 
cases involving anaphora. What does it really mean representing the object as the 
same? The fact that they represent their referent as the same doesn’t mean that they 
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are of the same type. Cases involving anaphora is an example. In some 
circumstances the anaphoric term is not of the same type as the other term. 
However, cases involving anaphora are cases in which co-reference de jure holds, 
which means that the term which introduces the referent and its anaphoric are 
positively coordinated and, thus, represent the object as the same. In virtue of the 
semantic constraints derived from linguistic rules about that the speaker is 
competent, Fine gives us the clue to explain the sameness at the semantic level. But 
what is happening in the speaker’s mind in order that he takes them to representing 
the same? 
Bearing this in mind, one first attempt is to argue that the speaker 
transform the anaphoric expression into a term of the same kind through an 
abstraction process. In anaphora and any other recurrence cases, the speaker takes 
the recurring expression and conceives it as belonging to the same type as the 
recurred expression. May and Fiengo (1994) characterizes it as two terms of the 
same abstract syntactic type.34 The speaker abstracts a single type from the co-
referential expressions and this would be the clue to account for the fact that, in true, 
they are co-referential de jure despite the fact they are typographically distinct. But 
this seems not so convincing because we would ultimately be saying that the 
expressions below are of the same kind when in fact it seems counter-intuitive:  
 
(7) I met my neighbouri the other day. 
(8) The bastardi didn’t even give a hello. 
 
The expression in (7) the bastard is used anaphorically to refer to the 
same individual that my neighbour does in (8) and the indexing i is the mark to 
indicate that they are positive coordinated. According to May and Fiengo, given that 
the speaker builds a singular abstract type from both expressions tokened, the 
responsible for the same indexing would be that abstract type.35 The competent 
speaker who understands the piece of discourse above applies the same abstract 
type when he processes anaphora. But the consequence is to admit that my 
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 Recanati, p. 7. 
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neighbour and the bastard are expressions of the same type in some sense, which 
seems something weird. 
Recanati argues that what happens is that the terms are co-indexed by the 
same mental file and no transformation of linguistic type occurs. The speaker 
associates the co-referential terms with same mental file, which makes him take both 
of the expressions to be representations associated with the same representational 
file. When the speaker deploys the recurring term, what happens is that even though 
the term comes to be different typographically, the speaker deploys the same mental 
file he deployed early, which makes him represent the object as the same.36 This 
avoids to say that there’s a type identity at the level of the linguistic tokens, which is 
counter-intuitive if we take into account our understanding about the expressions my 
neighbour and the bastard. The identity, Recanati says, is at the conceptual level and 
provides us with an account for the speaker’s action of taking them as representing in 
a way that he takes the terms deployed as being co-referential de jure. 
But what exactly makes the speaker trade upon identity? We know that 
coordination at the linguistic level is obtained in virtue of semantic constraints related 
to linguistic rules, such as the linguistic rule that governs the use of anaphora. but 
what Recanati says is that the coordination is a phenomenon due primarily to the way 
the speaker co-index representations using mental files. The speaker bearing this in 
mind will pack all this information related to the co-referential terms in the same file 
and index those terms using that file. The perceptual capacity of tracking an object 
during a perceptual experience over time is an example of how the operation of co-
indexing representations works. Think about the hundred times we look at an object, 
for example, an airplane crossing the sky, and start tracking it over time. We create 
several of representations of the same object over time. It happens because we 
associate all those time-lapsing representations with the same mental file we created 
in the very first moment we caught that object on our perceptual apparatus. Co-
reference de jure between the mental representations holds in this case because 
they are build upon the same mental file, that is, the representations are indexed by 
the same mental file. This process is what characterizes the cognitive constraint 
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which makes the speaker take a bunch of representations as a chain of continuing 
the reference.37 With this model, coordination that occurs at the propositional level 
can be rendered in terms of coordination that occurs in the speaker’s cognition. 
In those cases in which the representations are positively coordinated, 
what happens is that all the information related to both representations are put in the 
same mental file, which means that all the representations indexed by this file will do 
the job of explicitly continuing the chain of the reference. The anaphora would be just 
a manifestation of this cognitive process. Co-reference de jure, thus, is ultimately a 
phenomenon resulted of this process of co-indexing representations involving mental 
files. 
2.5 My Objections 
 
In this section I present my objections to Recanati’s proposals. The 
objection I.a and I.b are dedicated to contend his view presented in sections 2.2 and 
2.3 and the objection II is dedicated to challenge his view presented in section 2.4 
2.5.1 Objection I.a 
 
Let’s focus on the following Recanati’s claim: “[...] It must not be possible 
for the language user to be mistaken as to whether or not de jure co-reference 
relations hold”.38  
Recanati’s strategy, as we’ve seen, was to weaken the base relation R so 
that the speaker doesn’t fail to know that M and N co-refer. I don’t think things should 
be so. There’s no special reason for co-reference de jure to be based on conditional 
co-reference. As other kinds of cognitive states, knowledge is likewise to many of 
them, except that it holds just in very special conditions. In this case, an agent gets 
knowledge just in case he has the proper belief attitude and, in addition to it, factors 
of external world contributes contributes for that belief to be true. If we follow the 
standard definition of knowledge, the agent should present the following conditions in 
order to get knowledge: 
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1. The agent believes that p 
2. The agent is justified to believes that p 
3. The way the world is contributes for that believe to be true. 
 
As our goal is not to get in details about the specific aspects of this 
definition, but just assume that, for the sake of the argument, if this definition is 
correct, there are many kinds of cognitive states which don’t satisfy those 
conditions.39 Likewise, co-reference de jure is the kind of cognitive state in which the 
speaker achieves it only if he has the proper belief attitude and that attitude meets 
specific factors of the external world, which means that co-reference de jure holds 
when his cognitive state meets those conditions. So if agents fail to get knowledge in 
many situations, why would it be different with co-reference de jure given it is a kind 
of knowledge? Unless we are talking about knowledge of claims which are logically 
trivial, knowledge is something hard, a cognitive state which doesn’t depend 
exclusively upon speaker’s state of mind neither merely derived deductively from 
logical truths. In many circumstances, even though speakers are aware of the 
reasons why they believe that some proposition p is true, and could be able to 
explain it, world is not the same way their belief represents the world, which entails 
that they didn’t get knowledge even when they are entitled to hold it. Just weakening 
base relation so that it can fit the condition (3) seems to rape the sense that is 
ascribed to knowledge as an achievement cognitively special for agents to unlock. 
In my view, conditional co-reference could be fill in the position of being 
the apriori and trivial knowledge that speakers hold about the very conditions in which 
M and N would refer, if anything, and co-reference de jure would be another kind of 
co-reference, modelled in terms of Fine’s strict co-reference. Recanati’s objection is 
that if we do it, co-reference de jure would not be transparent anymore. But I think 
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 Someone could reasonably ask, for example, what type of justification is involved in this definition. 
This question asks whether justification is given in terms of internal access or something external, that 
is, not dependent upon the way the agent provides himself with reasons and explanations for holding 
his belief. There are models which explain knowledge using the first approach. Those models are 
known as internalist view about epistemic justification. On the other hand, those models which see 
justification as dependent exclusively upon external factors regardless whether the agent get access 
to explanations for his belief are called externalists. 
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he’s thinking about conditional co-reference and strict co-reference in the wrong 
direction. If conditional co-reference holds, strict co-reference can also does, and 
what determines that one turns into another is the way the world beyond the 
language is. I can know apriori that if N is deployed with the intention of taking the 
same reference of M, whatever the reference of M might be, then they will be co-
referential terms. This is the way conditional co-reference holds and has the same 
features of reflexive content. In absence of information about the reference, the 
speaker knows at least that 
 
1. The Wally’s sequence of tokens t is an utterance 
2. The person whose permissive convention c associates him with the 
token Udo needs a haircut 
3. The linguistic rule r associated with the token he binds its referent to the 
referent of the token Udo, whatever it might be, if it refers at all. 
 
These contents are not exhaustive, but it shows how the speaker would 
process referential terms in absence of information beyond his linguistic competence. 
But reflexive content doesn’t provide us with so privilege content, even though it 
helps the speaker to understand what is being done with the utterance containing 
such reflexive content. Other level of content would be the referential content, the 
kind of content which can be associated with an utterance when its referential terms 
indeed stands respectively for their referents. This content is richer because let 
speakers know facts about external world. In this situation, he is able to grasp the 
proposition whose constituents is the very individual about which the proposition says 
something. Only few people can be in such state. Of course, the speaker doesn’t 
need to have direct contact with the referent in order to be entitled to knowledge 
about this very referent. Since the speaker gets into the chain of reference by binding 
his token to the name that is ruled by this chain when reference holds, that token 
comes to be really referential, that is, the term stands for an individual in the world. 
He gets knowledge when his token comes to be part of the chain of reference. So a 
speaker who sincerely believes in a knows the proposition expressed by a 
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(a) Aristotle is the author of Nicomachean Ethics. 
 
Essentially because that token Aristotle participates of the chain of 
reference whose end is Aristotle in person and he ascribed the attribute expressed by 
the predicate contained in a to that person, which is correct, according to the 
knowledge of specialists. So, anyone who uses the token Aristotle with the same 
intention of a is capable of getting knowledge at referential level. Co-reference de 
jure, then, holds when this level is achieved. First, the reflexive level is achieved 
simply by the fact that the speaker correctly mobilized his linguistic competence. 
Second step occurs when actual reference holds. This step is something restrictive, 
because it’s not always the speakers succeed in referring. Essentially the restrictive 
aspect lies on the following the difference: in co-reference de jure existential import is 
present, whereas conditional co-reference doesn’t present such commitment, and we 
know that is much harder to get true statements when existential import is present. 
Thus, there is nothing intrinsically wrong in a co-reference relation not to satisfy those 
requirements to get it into knowledge. He will know that M and N co-refer just in case 
he goes from the first step to the second one, but it is something which the external 
world decides whether or not he gets into this selective cognitive state. 
2.5.2 Objection I.b 
 
There is another objection to Recanati’s arguments which should be 
made. The anaphora example upon which he build his argument is not correct, in my 
view. I will explain why this is so by using Perry’s concept of directing intentions.  
 
Let's focus on the following point for which Recanati makes: 
 
Wally uncontroversially refers to Udo, but Zach’s pronoun is linked deictically 
to the person he sees and anaphorically to Wally’s pronoun, since Zach 
wrongly assumes that the person he sees is the person Wally was referring 
to.
40
 
 
And this another one 
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Certainly, the pronoun in Wally’s mouth does refer (it refers to Udo). But it is 
implausible that the second pronoun (in Zach’s mouth) also refers to Udo. 
Clearly, Zach is confused: he purports to refer not to Udo, but to another 
person he sees, whom he wrongly takes to be the person Wally was 
referring to.
41
 
 
He argues that Zach refers to one person if we take his token deictically 
and to another one if we take his token anaphorically. Because of that duplicity in the 
reference mechanism of Zach's token, Recanati concludes that his token does not 
refer at all, because when a singular term refers to two things at the same time it 
violates the mechanism presupposed the reference works, that is, that the function of 
any referential term is to be capable of referring to, and only one, singular object or 
individual. This grounds his reasoning of claiming that is implausible to say that 
Zach's token also refers to Udo. I think he is wrong and I will show why. 
Recanati confuses what is just speaker's intention from external factors 
that matters to determine the reference of Zach's token. The notion of directive 
intention helps us to clarify it. According to this notion, by deploying an referential 
expression, the speaker is able to determine the role the object he intends to achieve 
plays, but is not able of determining which object he will refer by using such 
expression.42 Perry argues that the only thing which speaker has authority is to 
determine this role, but reference is something which, at the end of the day, is 
determined by the world. So, the speaker has control of what role a certain object will 
play when he deploys a referential expression, but it is out of his control to determine 
which object he will refer by using such expression. In the Wally-Zach example, the 
reference mechanism is a bit different. In my view, Zach's deployment of the token 
determines what is the role of this expression, which is to bind (or recur) the 
reference of Wally's token, whichever person he refers. But his intention of referring 
to the guy he is looking at by using this anaphoric device fails. In many cases 
speakers fail to get the individual they intend to refer, even though they succeed in 
referring at all according to the mechanism behind the expression they tokened. 
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Suppose that two speakers, Bob and Carl, having fun at some party are talking to 
each other and suddenly Bob says: 
 
(1) Awesome, that guy is drinking caipirinha (looking at some guy with red 
hat). And Carl says: 
(2) Sure, he is drinking caipirinha (looking at another guy with a red hat 
also drinking caipirinha). 
 
Suppose that Mary, a third person in the context, was paying attention to 
their dialogue and figured out that the guy Carl looked at was not the same as the 
Bob did, which means that the guy Bob refers is not the guy who Carl's token refers. 
At first glance, she can indulge Carl by understanding that his token actually stands 
for the person Bob's token stands for, whichever he might be. But, in the end of the 
day, if Mary takes seriously how the reference mechanism behind demonstratives, 
she ascribes falsity to what Carl said because even though the intention of Carl was 
to continue the recurrence process of reference she concludes that what Carl really 
refers to by means of his tokens he was another person. According to the notion of 
directing intention, Carl has authority to determine what kind of role the referent will 
play, but it is not in his hands to determine to which object he refers. So Carl is able 
to determine that the referent of the demonstrative he tokened will be the addressee 
of the utterance, but he is not able to determine which individual will be referred to by 
the token. Thus, Wally planned to refer to Udo by deploying his token of he, via 
anaphora, but he referred to another person because he didn’t deploy the 
demonstrative carefully. 
2.5.3 Objection II 
 
I want to focus on the following Recanati’s point in which he defends that 
relations like coordination is ultimately due to cognitive features: 
 
Arguably, there is nothing specifically linguistic about trading on identity, 
coordination, etc. Suppose I hold a glass in my hand while looking at it. The 
glass looks dirty, and it feels cold. When, on the basis of my perceptual 
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experience, I judge that the glass is cold and dirty, I trade upon the identity of 
the seen glass and the touched glass.
43
 
 
He argues that those relations which are characterized as coming from 
linguistic features are something that actually come from the speaker’s cognition and 
how these constraints impact his representations. As he continues, “when, on the 
basis of my perception of the glass, I form the intention to drink from it, there is co-
reference de jure between the referential elements in the perceptual judgment and 
the intention based on it”44. And he concludes saying that “co-reference de jure, even 
though it manifests itself in language, is first and foremost a phenomenon at the level 
of thought”.45 So what Recanati defends is that the co-indexing of representations is 
similar to the process of tracking an object through the time and, based on that 
perceptual experience, the speaker take that object as being the same. It is the 
constraints caused by tracking the object perceptually that determines the way 
speaker’s representations will be co-indexed. In the case specifically about co-
reference de jure, he says that even though the recurrence relation between two 
expressions can be encoded at the level of language, the primary reason for this 
relation to hold is the recurrence at the cognitive level. So the co-indexing on which 
co-reference de jure is based on the co-indexing process the cognition makes. 
As Recanati argued, because the different representations are associated 
with the same singular mental file, it means that they are co-indexed in virtue of the 
association with this singular mental file. And since this co-indexing process occurs at 
the cognitive level, he concludes that the co-indexing of representations are due to 
cognitive constraints, even anaphora and its sameness of linguistic expressions is 
just a manifestation of what essentially occurs at the level of thought. 
I disagree with this proposal and in the following lines I will dedicate the 
following lines to show why exactly. Even though I agree with the idea that there are 
situations in which representations are co-indexed in virtue of cognitive constraints, 
like the ones that come from perceptually tracking an object through time, I don’t 
agree that all representations are co-indexed in virtue of it. There are other kind of 
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constraints beyond cognitive ones and one of them is constraint imposed by 
semantics. Of course the speaker relies on a single mental concept to co-index the 
different representations he builds, but where does this constraint come from that 
enforces him to associate all his instantaneous representations with this single 
concept? In the case of perceptually tracking an object, surely the answer is from this 
very perceptual process, but in the case of anaphora, the constraint is the semantic 
rule which governs the use of anaphoric terms. This makes me agree with Fine’s 
proposal of coordination and how it accounts for utterances involving anaphora. The 
semantic constraint behind the anaphoric use is the reason why the speaker, at the 
cognitive level, represents the object by co-indexing its representations to a single 
concept in his mind. Anaphora is a relation of dependency which ultimately is built 
upon the linguistic rule that says “take the referent of the term that is recurred, 
whatever might be the referent”, which means that there is a semantic constraint 
responsible for driving the speaker’s behavior. It is not clear when Recanati insists 
that the constraint upon which co-reference de jure builds is not linguistic, but 
cognitive. Moreover, in semantics once you establish the interpretation for a certain 
set of symbols, all things work according to this interpretation, no matter what is the 
speaker’s intention in using a expression derived from this interpretation. Therefore, 
in the case of rules which will govern the expressions is not different, since the 
interpretation is established, semantics does its job and the linguistic rules derived 
from it obey what has been established. 
Take anaphora behind the example involving anaphoric term above as 
being the rule of dependency of reference and let’s call it aP. So aP denotes the rule 
that establishes the dependency between those terms in a way that the anaphoric will 
refer to the same object the other term refers, if anything. The co-indexing of those 
terms relies on aP. The mental representations can be said as co-indexed by a single 
concept in the speaker’s cognition. But it occurs because of the constraint that aP 
generated. It seems that Recanati is looking at this phenomenon of co-indexing at the 
cognitive level and labelling a cause which is in fact a effect of other constraint. The 
anaphora at the level of thought is a result of the constraint produced at the linguistic 
level, so it is a constraint from semantic nature which determines the co-indexing of 
representations at the mental level, and not the other way around. So Fine’s 
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characterization of coordination as due to semantic features I think it’s correct. The 
expressions in anaphora are positively coordinated because there is a semantic 
constraint which comes from the way anaphora works, which means that this relation 
of coordination manifest, not only in the expressions tokened, but in the speaker’s 
representations in virtue of aP.  
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3. Network content and Empty Names 
 
Now I want to analyse the issue involving empty names and Perry’s 
proposal to deal with what is said by utterances containing them. The problem 
concerns the semanticists who want to provide an account for how could true 
negative existential statement can be true and say something if no proposition were 
expressed? 
3.1 Jacob Horn’s history and the problem of no existence 
 
The case Perry presents is the Jacob Horn’s story. This story is part of 
Horn’s Papers and tells the story of a person who allegedly lived during Colonial 
America. He is a fictional character who was pictured as a real person in Horn’s 
Papers.46 This diary was spread among people as reporting his days and 
achievements in Colonial period. For a long time historians and common-sense 
people believed that Horn’s Papers was written by Jacob Horn (JB) who really lived 
somewhere in Colonial America during 18th century. Those people had a different 
attitude towards the statements that compose Horn’s Papers. They don’t act as if 
they were fooling themselves for the sake of entertainment, as we act when we know 
that the story is fictional. In this case, we fool ourselves in the sense that we know 
that the characters actually don’t exist, but in order to acquire entertainment we 
pretend that we believe they are actually real. It’s not what happens to Horn’s 
Papers. 
When people believed he lived somewhere in America at a given time, 
they really had that belief. When they had that belief, they weren’t acting in a way that 
they pretended they believe that JB existed. In fact, they act in the same way as 
someone does when they believe that Napoleon was defeated in the Battle of 
Waterloo. But if the name JB actually refers to nothing, how could people hold a 
belief whose content doesn’t have JB as its constituent? We know that a belief only 
exists if there’s a content about which this belief is. Belief is one of the many 
propositional attitudes, and as such it is a relation between an agent and a 
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proposition. But if there’s no content toward which the agent has a believing attitude, 
how can this person have such belief? That’s the difficulty behind utterances 
containing the name JB.  
Perry borrows from Donnellan a proposal which involves something that 
he calls block.47 According to this proposal, story involving the name JB ends in a 
block, which means the historical chain of reference which rules the use of the name 
in fact ends in a point where no individual is identified, and this point characterizes 
the block.  
   
When the historical explanation of the use of a name (with the intention to 
refer) ends [...] with events that preclude any referent being identified, I will 
call it a block.
48
 
 
For example, children often invent imaginary companions whom they 
themselves come to speak of as actual. The block in such case would occur 
at the point at which a name for the unreal companion gets introduced by the 
child himself via his mistaken belief that there is a companion to [that] 
name.
49
 
 
The truth-conditions we meet at utterances involving JH could be given in 
terms of facts concerning this block, as Donnellan explains: “If N is a proper name 
that has been used in predicative utterances with the intention to refer to some 
individual, then ‘N doesn’t exist’ is true iff the history of those uses ends in a block”.50 
So this content can be used to handle issues that are puzzling from the semantic 
viewpoint. Any utterance that has meaning should be true or false, and in order to 
have meaning an utterance should express a content, which is given in virtue of the 
semantic contribution of its components. That content results a proposition and it’s 
the proposition which it expresses that delivers its truth-conditions and allows it to be 
evaluated as being true or false. Take the example below: 
 
(1) Bill Gates is the owner of Microsoft. 
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The proposition that speakers normally aim to convey by (1) is the 
proposition containing the very individual about which the proposition says 
something, which we already know is called singular proposition and can be 
represented as we’ve been doing: 
  
 (P1) 
  
This proposition (P1) is characterized as being what is said by the speaker 
when he utters (1), that is, what is expressed when the speaker utters (1), without 
taking into account other information that might be co-laterally produced by his 
utterance. Furthermore, (P1) provides us with facts that allow us to grasp the truth-
conditions concerning (1) because it says that Bill Gates is in a relation of ownership 
with the private company Microsoft. This content permits the utterance to be verified 
and has one of the possible truth-values, true or false, according to its 
correspondence with the way the world is. So the truth-condition of (1) given those 
facts provided by (P1) could be represented as follows:  
 
(TC1) The utterance (1) is true iff Bill Gates is the owner of the private 
company Microsoft. 
 
The semantic treatment should be the same to other utterances, 
regardless the type of expressions they contain. So we should be able to look for a 
content which can work as a provider of truth-conditions for all utterances we are 
handling. Now take the following three utterances: 
  
(2) JH exists 
(3) JH doesn’t exist 
(4) JH was an important person in Colonial America 
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These utterances are specially puzzling because no singular proposition is 
expressed by them because JH has no reference. If there’s no proposition it’s not 
possible to ascribe a truth-value to them. Moreover, without propositions we aren’t 
able to provide truth-conditions because there is no content can be verified. So in the 
case of (3), ‘how can it be true?’ And in the case of (2) and (4), ‘how can they be 
false?’ And something connected with this issue, we can ask ‘what is said?’ by (2)-(4) 
if no proposition is expressed by them? This seems an important problem because, 
intuitively, it’s easy to ascribe truth-values if speakers are told to do it. Moreover, it’s 
weird to say that someone is saying nothing when he utters either (2), (3) or (4). So 
the problem can be rendered in a two-fold way: (a) what are the truth-values of these 
utterances? and (b) in virtue of what propositional content they are either true or 
false? 
I will present two answers to these questions. One is Salmon’s proposal 
and the other is the overshared Russell’s analysis. Next I will explain why this 
proposals don’t answer properly the questions. Finally, I will argue that Perry’s 
proposal provides an adequate answer. 
3.2 Salmon’s proposal 
 
First of all, in this section I want to start it making clear that Salmon bears 
in mind that the semantic framework he proposes is not able to deal with 
informativeness and, as he contends, the answer for the question how do two co-
referential terms can convey different information? relies upon pragmatics. All his 
arguments are dedicated to show how theorists make mistakes by ascribe some 
cognitive features to semantics when in fact they rise from pragmatic aspects 
embedded in natural language. What I want to refute is one of the entailments of his 
thesis, which says that semantics is not able to deal with issues related to 
informativeness. I think semantics is able to do this job after showing why Salmon’s 
semantic framework is unable to do it. 
Salmon argues that (2)-(4) indeed don’t express any proposition at all. He 
explains that as people can fail to recognize an individual under other physical 
appearance they can also fail recognize propositions under different modes of 
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presentation.51 The information is conveyed by an utterance is entirely provided by 
the singular proposition it expresses, and nothing more, according to Salmon’s 
proposal. So when a speaker has different belief attitudes toward co-referential 
utterances, what happens is not that the speaker grasp different propositions. In fact, 
something different occurs. The speaker, when faced with the same proposition p, 
may fail to recognize it if p has been presented to him under a different and 
unbeknownst mode of presentation, and because of it, he happens to take p as being 
a different piece of information. One important idea in Salmon’s proposal is that belief 
is a ternary relation, composed by the agent, the proposition, which is the singular 
proposition, and the mode the proposition is presented, or the way the proposition is 
taken by the speaker.52 So is perfectly acceptable for a speaker to have contrary 
belief attitudes toward utterances which express the same proposition.  
Salmon draws an analogy with cases of perception, in which an agent fail 
to recognize an individual who she had acquaintance already. An agent might 
happen to see the very same person twice without recognizing her the same person. 
In this case, the thought that he had first is exactly the same as the one he had latter. 
However, he didn’t realize that he was in presence of the same content because he 
was under a different mode of presentation strange to the speaker.53 
The case in the language level could be exemplified by Louis Lane’s 
failure. Suppose they all are real people. Although she gives approval to (5), she 
disapproves (6), in the sense that she sincerely would agree that (5) is true while (6) 
is false if she were asked. 
 
(5) Superman has laser vision. 
(6) Clark Kent has laser vision. 
 
(5) and (6), according to Salmon, convey the same information since the 
proposition they express is the same, which can be represented as below as Pk: 
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 (Pk) 
  
 
Said that, Salmon’s account says that Louis Lane’s content thought 
doesn’t change. The proposition she entertains is exactly the same, in this case, Pk. 
What occurs is that she failed to recognize that she was before the same proposition 
when she met (6). She took (5) and (6) to be conveying two different pieces of 
information because she grasped Pk by means of two different modes or guises, that 
is, she takes Pk in two different ways, one which made her dispose to assent and 
another which made her neglect her assenting. All the issue is under what guise she 
accesses the proposition which is her content thought. 
The flaw of this account is that it should accept that utterances like (5)-(6) 
don’t express any content and, hence, bite this bullet. If all information which is 
conveyed by an utterance is provided uniquely by its singular proposition, then those 
utterances to which no singular proposition can be associated would be unable to 
convey information, according to this reading. In those cases, informativeness could 
be explained by appealing to guises, but the explanation of why they are either true 
or false would remain to be a flaw in this account. 
3.3 Russell’s proposal 
 
The other answer is Russell’s well known analysis.54 The Russellian 
answer has a clue concerning utterances containing proper names which aims to 
circumvent the problem of emptiness and lack of acquaintance with reference. In the 
case of the name JH, he suggests that we take JH and replace it by a quantified 
expression which can be analyzed in terms of other several expressions that amount 
to predicates all under the quantifier scope. The name JH, in this reading, is reduced 
to another expressions that actually points to properties and treats JH as a term 
                                            
54
 Russell (1919), pp. 167-180. 
73 
 
which, in fact, gathers a cluster of predicates. The name Socrates, thus, is actually a 
cluster of predicates and when people uses this name in an statement they are 
referring to a bunch of properties, not directly to Socrates in true. They refer to 
Socrates only if there’s an individual who uniquely satisfies all of these properties 
referred by the predicates gathered by the term Socrates. Reference only works if 
denotation does, which means that JH is, in fact, is a denoting expression that is 
disguised as a referential expression. As we know, names, according to this view, are 
considered disguised description and the consequence of it is to treat proper names 
as definite descriptions. 
 So, according to Russell’s proposal, when we look at (3), for example, 
we should disentangle ambiguities and analyze the logical form of it in order to 
characterize what (3) expresses. There are two readings for the scope of the 
negation operator when we make explicit the two possible ways which we can state 
(3): 
 
(P3a) ~[there is x: K(x) & for all y: x = y] 
(P3b) there is x: ~[K(x) & for all y: x = y] 
where ~ denotes negation and K(x) denotes the cluster of properties which 
is uniquely satisfied by x. 
 
In the analysis of (3), we should choose (P3a) if we want to avoid any 
existential commitment which would make us assume the existence of something 
which, in fact, doesn’t exist. So, according to this choice, what is being said when the 
speaker utters (3) is not that some individual does not satisfy a certain property, but 
that the statement that the bunch of properties K is uniquely satisfied by an individual 
is not verified, which is something true. This analysis provides us with a propositional 
content and a truth-value to (3). 
But this also gets in trouble. Counter-examples presented by Kripke in his 
modal argument knocks down Russell’s proposal. Starting from the common-sense 
view about how linguistic expressions work in natural language, Kripke shows that 
the mechanism which governs the operating of a definite description is not conceived 
as the same as the one governs that the operating of a proper name. I will not get 
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into details about his objection, I’ll just show briefly the different mechanism each one 
has and explain why this has impact on Russell’s proposal, which it’ll take just few 
couple of lines. 
Proper names are conceived in natural language as tools for direct 
reference, according to Kripke, and we see it looking at the way common-sense 
people deploy them in their daily life as speakers. A name, in this view, is a tag for 
picking out a certain object, no matter whether this object satisfies a bunch of 
identifying conditions or not. Since a name is linked to a individual by a baptizing act, 
if an occurrence of this name is deployed to refer to that individual, regardless the 
world and circumstance in which it was deployed, the individual grasped continues to 
be the individual of the world in which he was baptized.55 It’s not the same thing with 
a definite description (let’s call it DD). A DD will pick out an individual iff this individual 
satisfies the identifying condition which is involucrated by the DD at stake. So if we 
take the DD the highest student of the class, it will only pick out an individual if there’s 
an individual which uniquely satisfies this condition in the circumstance in which this 
DD was deployed. These two different mechanisms make proper names and DDs 
present behavior in possible worlds. 
Since a name is attached to an individual by an act of baptizing, it will 
always refer to that name when it’s deployed, no matter in which world this is done. 
However, a DD is attached to individual only if this individual uniquely satisfies the 
identifying condition the DD determines in the world the DD is deployed. This entails 
that different objects might be captured by the same DD according to the world that 
this DD is deployed, because it’s always possible to conceive a world in which a 
certain individual that is captured by a DD in actual world as not being captured by 
the same DD in other world. As names are rigid designators, their reference 
mechanism preclude them from referring to a different object in different worlds. So 
since a name N and DD differ from each other to the extent to referring mechanism, 
there could be a possible world in which N and definite description DDN captures the 
same individual, but this may not occur in all other possible worlds.56 This seems a 
good and well-established objection against Russell’s idea that proper names are 
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disguised definite descriptions, in the sense that all proper names in fact are definite 
descriptions, because, if they were, they would always capture the same individual or 
object as their referent. But as Kripke has shown, it doesn’t always happen. So 
Russell’s answer provides (2)-(4) with propositional contents (which allow us to 
provide them with truth-values and truth-conditions), but it is knocked down by the 
modal argument. 
3.4 Perry’s proposal and Network Content 
 
Perry presents an alternative to the proposals we’ve seen. He says that 
there’s a propositional content which involucrates the very permissive convention 
responsible for governing the use of names contained in a certain utterance. This 
permissive convention is the rule which assigns a name (and all its occurrences) to a 
certain individual. The act of baptizing Socrates as Socrates works as the permissive 
convention which rules the use of the name all the occurrences of Socrates in the 
contexts in which they are deployed. Some speaker who is linguistically competent, 
but doesn’t know who is Socrates, holds in his hands at least the knowledge about 
facts related to the very expressions.57 So, if he meets (7), he will know at least that 
this individual, whoever he is, whose name is ruled by a permissive convention c 
satisfies the attribute given by the predicate is a sophist, whatever the meaning it 
has58: 
 
(7) Socrates is a sophist 
 
The propositional content accessed by this speaker involves the 
permissive convention which rules that name he meets in utterance (7). And he 
draws it as a conclusion from the fact that that occurrence of Socrates was a name 
and as every name is ruled by a convention which rules it, this name is assigned to 
                                            
57
 Perry (2012), p. 128; 171. 
58
 Perry calls the permissive condition the convention which connects a certain name to a specific 
condition, that is, the condition which permits speakers call this individual using a token of the name 
conventioned to call him. 
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its reference by a specific permissive convention. Pr7 is the representation of this 
propositional content the speaker grasps. 
 
(Pr7) The individual whose permissive convention c assigns the name 
Socrates to him is a sophist. 
 
This content is accessible to the speaker in that circumstance and allows 
him to understand (7) even when he doesn’t know anything about Socrates. As we 
know, this characterizes the reflexive content of (7). This analysis has advantages 
over Russellian’s analysis. The expression the individual whose permissive 
convention assigns the name ‘Socrates’ to him encodes an identifying condition, 
which in this case captures Socrates. Let’s call it ic, But once ic is grounded on an a 
permissive convention which links directly an individual to his name, ic happens to be 
rigidified. It entails that it’s immune to modal argument because no matter what world 
ic is evaluated, it will always determine Socrates as its denotation. But it gets in 
trouble when we want to handle (2)-(4). 
Names like JH don’t have permissive conventions because they’re empty. 
Once JH stands for no individual at all, no permissive convention governs the use of 
that name, which means the reflexive content of the utterances in which JH occurs 
cannot be given in terms of permissive conventions, as it happens to regular names. 
In this case, the reflexive content is given in terms of networks of beliefs, or simply 
networks. A network is the network of beliefs speakers share with each other which 
governs the use of a certain name. But in the case of empty names, this network 
ends in a block. That is, its tail, which in regular names finds an origin (an individual 
or an object), has no origin when the name is empty. 
Even though JH is a empty name, the utterances in which it occurs are 
understood by competent speakers, which means that those speakers were able to 
have access to a propositional content at some level. As we know, reflexive content 
is the content that is missing all facts about the world except those ones which 
concerns linguistic competence. Given that the network which governs JH ends in a 
block (let’s call it NJH), the reflexive content of (2)-(4) could be given as follows: 
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(Pr2) There’s a network NJH that governs the use of JH in (2) and there’s 
an x such that x is the origin of NJH. 
(Pr3) There’s a network NJH that governs the use of JH in (3) and there’s 
no x such that x is the origin of NJH. 
(Pr4) There’s a network NJH that governs the use of JH in (4) and there’s 
an x such that x is the origin of NJH and x was an important person in 
Colonial America.59 
 
This is possible because the notion of truth-conditions is reformulated by 
Perry. As we’ve seen, truth-conditions are always related to specific facts. Multiple 
truth-conditions can be associated with a given utterance. Each one is given in terms 
of facts which in one way or another concern the utterance at stake. The truth-
conditions that contains the individual about which the utterance says something are 
very specific one and not always are available to speakers. The relativization of truth-
conditions to facts permits us to provide conditions to speakers evaluate a given 
utterance in the absence of knowledge about the individual or the subject-matter of 
the utterance. Perry argues that an utterance can always be said true or false if the 
following conditions are met: 
  
A. An utterance is true if truth-conditions are met at any level. If truth-
conditions are met at a given level, there will be truth-conditions at other 
levels. Otherwise, it’s not true. 
B. An utterance is false if it has truth-conditions at some level and it fails to 
meet them.60 
 
Notice that when an utterance happens to be false, it’s because it has 
truth-conditions but it fails to obtain. This case differs from the situation in which the 
utterance doesn’t present any truth-conditions at all, such as (8): 
  
(8) Borogroves are mimsy. 
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Once the expressions borogroves and mimsy doesn’t stand for anything at 
all, because they are not words in English, but simply tokens we’ve just made up, (8) 
is not able to present truth-conditions. If it cannot have truth-conditions, it cannot be 
said true or false.  
It’s different from (2)-(4). (8) doesn’t say something true or false. This 
entails that there’s nothing to agree or disagree when (8) is uttered. But (2)-(4) and 
other utterances that we may find in Horn’s Papers were subject of debate and 
discussion, which means that those people could access a content in virtue of which 
they formed such agreement, disagreement or any other belief attitude. So it seems 
reasonable to think that (2)-(4) do express propositional contents. But what exactly is 
said when someone utters (2)-(4) and the like? That is, what is believed or 
disbelieved with respect to (2)-(4)? 
Perry argues that not always what is said is the singular proposition (the 
referential content, in his terminology). Many times the referential content doesn’t 
give an account to answer the question what is said?. Consider the utterance below: 
 
(9) I’m Keith Donnellan.  
 
The great analytic philosopher Keith Donnellan can deploy (9) to introduce 
himself. In this case, the referential content of (9) doesn’t seem to be the appropriate 
content to account for what he meant by deploying (9). In fact, he wants to convey 
something a bit more sophisticated than simply saying that Keith Donnellan is Keith 
Donnellan, or that he is identical to himself. If we were his audience, we wouldn’t take 
this content to be the one Donnellan meant to convey. Instead, we assume he meant 
to say more than that and it leads us to seek alternative contents which can answer 
such question. 
One alternative, in this case, is to take the indexical content associated 
with the indexical I and link it to the referent of the name Keith Donnellan (KD). The 
indexical content of I is the agent of the context, that is, the person who is producing 
the very utterance his audience is hearing. It results that in uttering (17) Keith 
Donnellan is informing us that that guy before us is the guy whose name is KD. This 
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content is much more promising to organize our notion about KD. Since the 
referential content is unable to account for what is said by (9), the indexical content is 
promoted to what is said. In circumstances in which the referential content is 
irrelevant and cannot account for the information conveyed, other level of content is 
lifted up to the stage of what is said. When this other level of content is added to 
account for the information conveyed, Perry calls this new content incremental 
content. This is what Perry says this about the role of incremental content: 
  
His interlocutor could felicitously say he said his name was KD, but only a 
philosopher biting some bullet is likely to say he said that KD is KD. The 
triviality and irrelevance of the referential content lead us to choose 
alternative contents, in answering the question what did he say?. In such 
cases, we may not expect the questions what did he say? or what was said? 
[...] to have a unique acceptable answer. The structure [...] of available 
contents may have to be considered to understand what is going on.
61
 
 
A similar situation happens when utterances at stake contain empty 
names. Suppose that Sophia, a little girl who believes that Santa Claus is a kind old 
man with gifts, says (10): 
  
(10) Santa Claus is coming home tonight. 
 
Since the referential content of (10) doesn’t exist, we wouldn’t succeed in 
the explanation of the relevance of (10) if we appealed to this kind of content. In this 
case, let us be her audience. In this case, we should seek other available contents 
that could explain the relevance of uttering (10). The content involving the network 
and the expressions themselves of (10) seem to be the first alternative of available 
content because it is the one which only demands the linguistic competence of the 
audience. The reflexive content, thus, could accomplish this role. It gives the 
audience a content that allows, at least, to evaluate that (10) is actually an utterance, 
and not just a bunch of sounds, and, thus, something which can be said true or false.  
But this is just the first level of incremental content. This content results in 
truth-conditions which gives the audience just the opportunity of seeing that (10) is an 
utterance (thus, something which can be said true or false) and which involves a 
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network of beliefs he presupposes is shared by speakers. With this kind of content 
we just account for conditions under which (10) can be true or false given the 
linguistic competence of the speakers, but this content doesn’t give an account for 
what is said by (10). It’s weird to say that when Sophia utters (10) she is saying 
things concerning rules about the expressions and presuppositions about the very 
utterance (10). It’s more plausible to say that she’s saying something about the world 
beyond the utterance. So another level of content is demanded to do it.62 
Speakers continue to process of seeking available increment contents to 
account for the relevance of Sophia’s utterance. They should look for a incremental 
content which may involve other things rather than referential content, once this one 
doesn’t exist in the case of (10), but one is not so restrict as the reflexive content.  
Remember that clause A says that if we meet truth-conditions for a given 
utterance at any level, we are able to find truth-conditions for it at more or less 
incremental level. In the case of (10), we found truth-conditions in terms of reflexive 
content, which means that we are able to find truth-conditions for it at more 
incremental level. And we can claim that speakers do it. The audience choose the 
incremental content which contains the network which governs the name Santa 
Claus (SC), but which one does not mention the expressions and the utterance (10) 
itself. The difference is subtle but important to explain how the audience organize 
their notions toward (10). If, on the one hand, Sophia might not know what she is 
saying by deploying (10), because we may question her linguistic competence, her 
audience, on the other, should have clearly in mind what is being said by (10) in 
order to form a belief of agreement or disagreement toward her utterance.  
The network which governs the name SC has no origin, as it’s well known. 
Once minimally informed speakers bear this in mind, he can draw the conclusion that 
(10) is false and, thus, migrate from reflexive level to other more promising 
incremental one. The network content associated with (10) is pictured as follows: 
 
(N10) There’s a x that is the origin of NSC and x is coming home tonight, or 
simply, 
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(N10) The origin of NSC is coming home tonight. 
 
(N10) provides the speakers with a content that permits them to grasp 
what is conveyed by Sophia with (10) so that they can give their approval or 
disapproval on something beyond linguistic world. The audience takes (10) to be 
false for some reason, and this reason has connection with the relevance of (10). 
Speakers wouldn’t take it to be false if they weren’t entertained by a content which 
makes them behave that way. In face of (10), they seek alternatives to avoid 
considering utterances pointless. Instead, for the sake of benevolence in 
conversational practices, they make efforts to calculate a content which fills in the 
gap and feeds them with a reason to explain the relevance of the utterance they 
meet. So if they take (10) to be false, there’s a content to which they got access and 
in virtue of it they can take (10) to be relevant. By (N10), the audience can figure out 
that (10) says something about the network NSC which is famously exploited by lots of 
speakers but whose origin, in fact, doesn’t exist. But since its origin doesn’t exist, 
they can conclude that no one is coming home that night, as Sophia believes, which 
means that they can hold the belief that what Sophia is conveying is false. That is, by 
calculating the alternatives they rise the network content (N10), which allow them to 
assess what Sophia is trying to convey in the conversational context in which she 
deploys (10), something which can deserve the status of what is said. So (N10) can 
organize and manage audience’s notions and, thus, provide a reason for why to the 
extend the belief attitudes they present toward (10). 
Now we’re equipped with a more robust resource to provide an account for 
what is said by (2)-(4) and what is believed and disbelieved about (2)-(4). These 
utterances can also have network contents associated with them, likewise (10). The 
network contents of (2)-(4) can be depicted as follows: 
 
(N2) The origin of NJH exists. 
(N3) The origin of NJH
  doesn’t exist.  
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(N4) The origin of NJH exists and he was an important person of Colonial 
America.63 
 
(N2)-(N4) step a little further from explanatory viewpoint. They don’t just 
provide the conditions to (N2)-(N4) to be true or false, but also provide the content in 
virtue of which the speakers produce their agreement or disagreements on (2)-(4). 
Speakers can build this level of incremental content and form their belief attitudes 
grounded on it. With (N2)-(N4), we are able to affirm what is the subject on which the 
speakers agree or disagree with each other when they are in face of (N2)-(N4). As 
these incremental contents are about networks and their origins, we are allowed to 
ascribe connection with the world to the speaker’s agreements and disagreements. In 
other words, their belief attitudes are not toward linguistic expressions and rules 
which govern them, but toward things which go beyond this. Thus, when people 
believed that (3) is true, the content about which they have beliefs has the origin in 
NJH, whereas those people who disbelieved that (3) is true, the content about which 
their disagreements has the network NJH as its subject-matter. Disagreements and 
misunderstandings occurred because speakers didn’t really know whether NJH had 
an origin or not at that time. This allows us to distinguish the content expressed by 
(2)-(4) in comparison with (10). Speakers don’t put so much effort to give his 
disapproval on (10) as being true because the network involved in it (NSC in this case) 
is well known as not having an origin. However, speakers get into disagreements 
and, thus, could get stuck to give his assent to (3) because it was not so well known 
that NJH, in fact, had no origin. Being able to explain even this difference shows us 
how far the explanatory power of this approach can get. 
Thus, on the one hand, it has advantages over Salmon’s proposal 
because we don’t need to treat utterances like (2)-(4) as vacuous from propositional 
viewpoint. On the other, it has advantages over Russell’s because we can provide 
(2)-(4) with propositional content and, thus, with truth-conditions, in the same way as 
Russell’s analysis does, but with the difference that this content is immune to modal 
argument. 
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Conclusion 
  
 The views I defended here aim to show the power that semantic 
machinery has in face of problems involving informative value of referential 
expressions. In the Wally-Zach case, it seems that there are two notions of content 
involved. In one sense, the token that Zach produced is constrained by the 
dependency intrinsic to any anaphoric expression, which means that he refers to the 
same guy Wally referred to, whatever this guy might be. Zach using his token 
followed by a demonstration makes another guy salient for his audience, but given 
the fact that he produced his token in a situation he intended to continue the chain of 
reference, the mechanism of anaphora seems to overlap any speaker’s intention to 
attain the reference. Maybe I have to provide more reasons to argue in favour of this 
overlapping, but if the reader agrees that communication and, thus, the transmission 
of information is a collaborative task, it seems that speakers would rely on anaphora 
for the sake of benevolence. It allows us to give the best interpretation for the 
communication in the dialogue despite the Zach’s mess.  
In the other sense, someone can argue that the Zach’s intention 
predominates in the use of his token and, thus, the guy his token stands for is the guy 
he made salient by means of his demonstration, which is perceptually accessible to 
him. I tried to show that it is not a good strategy. Speaker’s intention has its job, but it 
is limited. I think that Perry’s concept of directing intention is a good route to deal with 
this problem. Wally has the power to determine what will be the role played by the 
referent of his expression, but he is not in charge of determining which individual he 
will refer by means of it. 
In the Jacob Horn’s case, I tried to show how the contributions of semantic 
machinery can provide a content for utterances that are seen, at first glance, 
inevitably empty, that is, with no semantic content. As I argued, it’s important to 
provide such an account because otherwise we should bite the bullet and accept 
weird situations, such as stating that anyone who produces an utterance containing a 
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token of the name Jacob Horn (JH) is not expressing any semantic content at all. The 
defenders of this idea argue that the problem of informativeness is solved by 
conversational implicature, in which the information is conveyed collaterally by the 
utterance in these circumstances. Although informative value can be account for in 
this way, this approach left behind the explanation for two facts, in my view: (i) in 
virtue of what proposition the utterance involving the token Jacob Horn is true or 
false; and (ii) in virtue of what propositional content someone can believe that that 
utterance is true or false, provided that belief is a kind of propositional attitude. With 
the help of the Perry’s concept of reflexive content, I think that my explanation is able 
to account for the informative value and, in addition, to the facts (i) and (ii). 
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